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NAVAL STRATEGY
NAVAL STRATEGY
COMPARED AND CONTRASTED WITH THE
PRINOIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
MILITARY OPERATIONS
ON LAND
Lectures delivebbd at U. S. Naval Wab College, Newport, b. i., between the tears 1887 aud 1911
BY
CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D.
Snittti states Nsbi
AUTHOR OP *'TRX DTFLUKHCB OP 8BA POWSB UFOH HI8TOBT, 1660-1788,'* "THB
INPLUBHCB OP SBA POWSB UPOS THS PRBHCH REVOLDTIOS AKD
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TO THB WAB OP 1812 '*
BOSTON LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY
1911
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Copyright, 1911,
By a. T. Mahan.
M nghtt reserved Published, November, 1911
TH« UHnrsBsmr press, gambridok, u.8.a.
PREFACE
As stated on the title-page, the text of this book is sub- stantially that of lectures given at the Naval War College, at various periods between the years 1887 and 1911.
The original lectures, which alone represent a methodical treatment, however brief, are contained seriatim in seven chapters, six to twelve inclusive. In these there has been some modification of details, owing mainly to the lapse of time introducing changes of conditions; but substantially and in plan they continue as first framed.
My acknowledgments and thanks are due to the pro- prietors and editor of the United Service Magazine (Lon- don), for permission to reprint an article contributed to it in 1893. The substance of this is between pages 222 and 242.
I owe thanks also to Rear Admiral Rajrmond P. Rodgers,
President of the College, and to Captain W. M9Carty
Little, of the College Staff, for facilities and assistance
constantly given.
A. T. Mahan.
October, 1911.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I Ihtroductobt
Date of origin of pieoent lectnies 1
Thdi sabsequent deyelopment 1
Changes in methods and weapons since inception 2
Changes do not affect Principles of Strategy, but the application of them 3
Three Naval Wars since first writing 4
General deyelopment of appreciation concerning Naval Strategy . • • 5
Blnstrations of the permanence of Principles 6
For due comprehension of Principles, historical Blnstratlon or personal
Experience is requisite 9
Napoleon and Nelson quoted in support 9
Wolfe*s habit of noting illustrations cited 10
Lord Wolselej quoted 10
Diyision of United States Battle Fleet between Atlantic and Pacific
condemned, by illustration of the Division of the Russian Fleet in
1904 II
History is a Record of Illustrations 12
Development of naval strategic thought in the past Twenty Tears . . 12
Illustrated in current naval practice 13
Olufltrated also by Naval Literature t . . 13
Darriens'"WarontheSea" 13
Daveluy's" Study of Naval Strategy" 13
Corbett's "England in the Mediterranean" and "England in Seven
Years' War" 13
Relation of Sherman's March to the Sea to the founding of the U. S.
Naval War College 14
Distinct methods of treating Strategy 16
Historical method preferred 16
Reciprocal effect of Principles and Illnstration 17
Close relation between National Policy and Military Preparations.
Illustrations 18
Necessity for Naval Officers to keep themselves acquainted with general
• International Conditions 20
vi CONTENTS
CHAPTER n Historical Illustrations and Comments
The First Requisite io considering a Theatre of War 22
Illnstration : The Stadjr of the Danube Region hy the Archduke Charles
of Austria 22
The Archduke's Campaign of 1796 against Jourdau and Moreau ... 23 Importance of : 1. Concentration ; 2. Central Position ; 3. Interior Lines ;
4. Communications 25
Proposed Series of Illustrations: 1. A Purely Land Campaign; 2. A
Mixed, or Combined, Military and Naval Situation; 3. A Purely
Naval Campaign 26
Struggle between France and the Austrian Dominions of Spain and
Germany, 1630-1660 27
Central Position of France 28
Lines of Communication, Spain to Central Germany 29
Spanish Navy unable to face Dutch Navy in English Channel .... 30 Consequent Importance of Mediterranean Line by Genoa, Milan, and
Alpine Passes 30
Application of these conditions to Central Position, Interior Lines, and
Communications 31
Comparison with Line of the Danube in Germany 33
Discussions of such situations in general 35
" War a Business of Positions " 86
Plevna Port Arthur Toulon Nearness a prime factor in position. Instances : Cadiz, Gibraltar, Malta,
Jamaica, Guantanamo Bay 38
Evasion by circuitous lines — Fautses Routet 38
Disastrous effect of popular apprehensions upon military dispositions . 39
France enters the Thirty Tears' War 40
French Navy transferred from Atlantic to Mediterranean 41
CHAPTER ra
Historical Illustrations and Commbrts
(Contintied)
Faulty conduct of War under Richelieu 43
Prime necessity of concentrating force. Nelson quoted 43
Application of same Principle to Ship Design 44
To Frontier Attack, and to Tactics 45
Bonaparte in Italy, 1796. Analogy to Archduke Charles in Germany
the same year 46
Attack on Flank preferred. Reason 46
CONTENTS vii
Analogy in Nayal Tactics. Trafalgar 47
Nelson's methods and reasons 48
Farragnt at Mobile 49
BatUe of the Japan Sea 49
Concentration the Principle underlying both Strategy and Tactics . . 49
Principle applied to Coast Defence and Attack 49
War of 1812 50
Military Lines diride for consideration into Three Parts 51
Application to United States Coast Lines 51
Resemblance of Florida Peninsula to that of Korea 52
Analysis of the nature of the advantage inherent in Central Position 53
One Power Standard. Two Power Standard 54
"K"and"But" 55
Napoleon before Ansterlitz
Togo before Tsushima
Archduke Charles in 1796
Fine saying of the Archduke, quoted 58
Application to proposed dirision of United States Fleet between Atlantic
and Pacific 58
Estimate of the value to be attributed to Concentration, Central Posi- tion, and Interior Lines 59
CHAPTER rV
HiBTORiOAL Illustrations and Commbntb
( Continued)
Historical Narrative resumed at death of Richelieu, 1642 61
Policy of Mazarin. Military features 62
End of Thirty Years* War 63
Hostilities continue between France and Spain 63
England under Cromwell appears on the scene 64
Reorganization of English Navy 64
Cromwell's Policy 65
Attempted political concentration of Dutch and English Republics . . 66
Refused then by Holland, but realized under William HI 66
War between England and Holland 67
Protection of Commerce 68
Naval Events in the Mediterranean 68
Naval Events in the English Channel 71
Necessity of Concentration recognized by English 72
Prostration of Holland through English control of Channel and trade . 74
Peace between England and Holland 74
Principle of Concentration to be applied in the spirit, not in the letter
only 74
Blnstration from War between Japan and Russia 75
Application to United States Atlantic and Pacific coasts 75
via CONTENTS
CHAPTER V
Historical iLLUSTRATiom and Commbhts
(Conduded)
Necessity of Pennanent Positions to effectiye naval action 76
Sommary of Events, 1654-1689, between First Anglo-Dntch War and
general European conflict 76
French Naval Enterprise in Mediterranean prior to 1650 77
Effect npon this of entrance of English Navy in 1654 78
Influence of Port Arthur upon War between Japan and Russia ... 79
Cromwell's Attack upon Spanish West Indies 80
Subsequent Peace with France and War with Spain 80
Death of Cromwell, 1658. Peace of Pyrenees between France and
Spain, 1659 81
Permanent Decline of Spain 81
Effect of Cromwell's Policy npon position of England in Europe ... 81
Subsequent Policy of the Stuart Kings 82
Jnstiflcation of Cromwell's Policy 82
Parallel conditions to-day 82
International impotence of England under Stuart Dynasty 83
National Internal Unity essential to External Influence 84
Illustration from Thirty Tears of French History, 1622-1655 .... 85 Power of Louis XIV illustrates Internal Consolidation opposed to Inter- national Dissennions 86
Speciflc military importance of Mediterranean, 1688-1713 86
Necessity of Permanent Positions illustrated by Mediterranean ... 87
General European Alliance against France 88
Military Plans of France 68
Consequent Significance of Mediterranean to the Allies, 1689-1713 . . 89
Contrast between this and its effect at earlier date 89
Courseof Naval Events, 1690-1696 90
Imperative necessity for Allies to have a permanent position in Medi- terranean 92
Strategic insight of William m 93
Orders Allied Fleets to winter in Cadis instead of returning home . . 93
Effect upon Savoy and upon French operations in Catalonia .... 94
Resultant action of Louis XIV in threatening invasion of England . . 04
Disastrous effect of consequent popular apprehension in England . . 94
In absence of Allied Fleets Barcelona falls, and Savoy forsakes Alliance 95 Substantial effect produced by the two years' stay of Allied Fleet in
Mediterranean 95
Exhaustion of France 95
Strategic effect of a military position in imposing delays: American Squadron on Lake Champlain, 1776; Mantua, 1796; Genoa, 1800;
Ladysmith, 1899; Port Arthur, 1904 95
CONTENTS ix
between France and Allies, 1697 96
Renewed War, 1708 96
Kew Political Combinations 96
Permanent influence of new war, 1702-1713 96
Death of William HI, 1702 97
Marlborough succeeds him in direction of the War 97
Marlborough's Plans 97
Summary of Eyents 98
Peace of Utrecht, 1713, by poeitions ceded, establishes Great Britain
in Mediterranean 98
Military importance of Mediterranean 99
Pazalleleffectof American Great Lakes in 181 2-18U 99
CHAPTER VI
Foundations and Prinoiplbs
Underlying intention of present lectures 100
Interest of United States in the Caribbean Sea when lectures first
written 100
Notable Subsequent Change 102
Analogy of Isthmus of Panama to Valley of Danube and to Valtelline
Passes. Of Caribbean Sea to Mediterranean 102
Influence of War with Spain upon International Relations of United
States 103
European Politics not indifferent to American Students of Strategy . . 103 Changes in European International Conditions and Relations since
1897 104
Significance of these to the United States 105
Broad significance of increased German Navy 105
Deyelopments of the Monroe Doctrine 106
The constitution of a National Fleet is a Strategic Question .... 107
Effect upon Great Britain of changes in International Conditions . . 109
Advantages of Germany and of Japan in present competitions . . . . 110 Ability of United States to protect its coasts and its external policies
dependent chiefly on naval strength 110
Growth of the ideas concerning Sea Power in last thirty years . . . Ill
The new great navies are American, German, and Japanese . . . . Ill Development of Naval Literature coincident with recognition of Sea
Power 112
Such Development is simply the formulation of previous recognized
truths ', 112
Naval Histoxy and Biography provide the Material for formulating
Strategic Principles 114
Cause of delay in developing naval Strategic treatment 1 14
Influence of Steam 115
X CONTENTS
Formnlation of Princifdefl imperative 115
Value of lUostratioiiB : Division of Dutch aud English Navies, 1652; Division of Rossian Fleet, 1904 ; Napoleon's Criticism of Division of
British Brest Fleet, 1805. Discussed 115
Steam has increased the significance of *' Communications " to Navies . 118
Special Object of Naval War College 119
The decisive considerations in any strategic problem are usnallj very few 1 20
The word "Key "illustrates this fact 120
Blnstration from legal profession 120
Value of knowledge of Land Warfare to naval students 121
Naval Strategy applicable in Peace as well as in War. Reason there- for 122
niostrations of Strategy in Peace 122
Large geographical scale of naval operations 124
Recent changed method of distributing Navies 124
Necessity for this. Reasons 125
" War a Business of Positions " . . 127
Caution as to application of this truth 127
Position of Cuba 127
Position of British Fleets in Wars with France 128
Position of same as affected by present German rivalry 128
Advantage of an Advanced Position, if securely held 129
Situation of British Islands relatively to Germany an instance of ad- vanced position 129
Raids not equivalent to interruption of '* communications " ISO
Contrasted effect of a concentration suitably stationed ISO
Advantage for advanced naval positions that they be interconnected by
land 131
Selection of positions involves consideration of intrinsic value and of
advanced situation 131
CHAPTER VII
FOUHDATlOlfS AND PrIMOIPLBS
( CmUinuid)
Three Principal Conditions affecting Strategic Value of any Position:
Situation, Strength, Resources 132
niustratiou from letter of Admiral Rodney 133
Situation the most indispensable condition 134
Circumstances affecting value of Situation 134
Radical difference underlying Land and Sea Strategy 135
Historical Instances 136
Controlling Strategic Positions rarer on Sea than on Land 138
Archduke Charles quoted 138
Strategic Positions largely determined by roads, especially by cross- roads 139
CONTENTS xi
Illiistratioiis iiom West India Islandfl 140
Strength of PoeitionB Ul
Defensive Strength analyzed and diflcussed 141
Coast-defence Ships 146
Torpedo Vessels and Submarines 147
EffectiTe part played by a defence System of Fortification on Sea and
on Land Frontiers 148
In Sea War, the Navy is the Army in the open field 149
Defence the Foundation ; Offence the Building 150
Effects of popular apprehension 150
Beliance upon Navy for defence of seaports leads logically to numerous
small ships 151
Every proposal to use Navy for defence only, found faulty. Reason . 152
True Sense in which Navy is an instrument of Defence 152
Summary of Reasons why Navy is not proper instrument for defence
of seaports 153
Offensive Strength of seaports analyzed and discussed 153
Effect of Submarine Mines 156
Relation of Tactical Conditions to Strategy 157
Proper Position of an Outside Fleet 157
Advantage of two outlets to a port 158
Power to support distant operations of a Fleet an element of offensive
strength in seaports 159
Supreme need of Docks 161
Illustrated in Russo-Japanese War 161
Reeoozces as an element of strength in seaports 162
CHAPTER Vin
FonNDATlONS AND PrINCIPLBS
Stratboic Linbs
Various Characters of Strategic Lines 164
Numerous lines available to vessels on open Sea 165
Importance of Lines of Communication 166
Instances 167
Value of Double Lines of Retreat, or of Communication 168
Athmtic Naval Bases of United States 169
Vladivostok and Port Arthur 170
A Sea Frontier with its ports a Strategic Line 171
Movements from port to port can rarely be bel^nd shore line .... 172
Use of inland waters by Torpedo Vessels 172
Problem of uniting a Fleet when divided between several ports . . . 173
Suggestions 174
Strategic effect of off-lying obstacles 174
Strategic questions involved in distant Transmarine Possessions ... 175
xii CONTENTS
Page
Primaiy importance among these of the Battle Fleet 176
Dependence of all external podtionB npon it lt7
Military Problem of Imperial Federation 179
Analogy to that of Great Britain daring Warn of American Independ- ence and French Reyolntion 181
Lord Kitchener qaoted 182
Application to coasts of United States 182
British naval strategic dispositions, past and present 183
Boni4>arte*s Egyptian Expedition. Analogies 183
Offensive seiznre of a Transmarine Position is followed inevitably by
defensive necessities 186
Analogy in Egyptian Expedition to Bonaparte's Campaign in Italy, 1 796 187
Also in War between Japan and Russia 188
Distant Expeditions more feasible by Sea than Land 189
Also less decisive, and more difficult to maintain 189
Conditions requisite to first success 190
Armies in the Field and Fleets at Sea more effective than Fortified
Positions 191
Nevertheless, Fortified Bases are necessary 191
Principles governing the selection of such 191
First essential military requisite of a Naval Station 195
Desirable number and character of such Stations 196
National importance of the Pacific Ocean to the United States . . . 197
Monroe Doctrine centres in Caribbean Sea 198
Maintenance of any system of external Fortified Ports depends upon the
navy 198
Proper Objective of a Navy is the Enemy's Navy 199
CHAPTER IX
FOUNDATXOMS AMD PrIMCXPLM
Distant Operations and Maritime Expeditions
Necessity of local Naval Bases on a theatre of Distant Operations . . 200
Characteristics of such Bases 200
Japanese and Russian Bases in Recent War 201
Order of importance in snch distant bases 202
Necessity of study to determine selection of bases 202
Operations of War. Object and Objective 208
Conditions essential to control of a Maritime Region 204
Operations in such distant regions a specific case of general military
operations 204
Specific feature differentiating them 205
Choice of Bases, of Objectives, and of Lines of Operation 205
niastradon of Bases : Great Britain, Austria, Russia, United States • 206
Lines of Operations and of Communications 207
CONTENTS xiii
Modem {oBtanceB of great Maritime Expeditions 208
Dependence of Boch npon naral preponderance 208
ConTojs are instances of naral protection localized 209
Effect of hostile arsenals near lines of operations, or of oommnnications 209
Two methods of protecting snch Lines 211
Advantage of more than one line of Oommnnications 21 1
Difference between Land and Sea Warfare, in control exercised bj
strong positions 212
Seasons. Exceptions. Illnstrations 213
Naval superiority essential to security of distant maritime bases . . . 213 Listances: Bonaparte in Egypt and Malta; Japan and Russia in Man- churia 214
Consequent probable necessity of Battle 215
Question discussed whether in great maritime expeditions the Fleet and
Troops should saQ together, or successively 215
Parallel between crossing sea and crossing river 216
Major Operations and Diversions 217
Position in which Defendant Fleet should endeavor to fight Invaders on
their voyage 218
Illustrations from History 219
Necessity for sustained Oonoentration of an invading naval force. Illus- tration from Bonaparte's Oommentaries 221
Essential change of function in Army and in Navy, after conquest of a
remote objective 222
Athenian Expedition against Syracuse, Analyzed and Discussed . . . 223
Essential features of Plan of Naval Operations proposed to Syracuse . 228
Analogy to Santiago in 1898, and to Port Arthur in 1904 229
Bonaparte's Egyptian Expedition, Analyzed and Discussed 230
Position of French in Egypt essentially Defensive 231
Effect of Naval Inferiority 231
Use to be made of an Inferior Navy under such conditions 232
Favorable effect of the Battle of the Nile upon British Naval dispositions 238 Comparison between the two Maritime Expeditions discussed and
certain cases of Land Warfare 240
The influence of a Flanking Position rests less in the Works than in
the Garrison, or in the Fleet, sheltered 241
CHAPTER X
Foundations and Pbinciplbs
Operations op War
Strategic use of a naval force after conquest of a distant Maritime Position 243
Illustration from Land Warfare. Napoleon's Instructions to Marmont, 1812 244
xiv CONTENTS
Gigantic nayal diyenion planned by Napoleon, 1804 246
Compariiion with conditions of Egyptian Expedition, 1798 247
Relations of Navy to Home Defence 248
Sea-Coast Fortresses primarily offensive in fonction ; not defensive . . 249
niostration. United States Squadron under John Rodgers, 1812 . . . 249 Determination of proper constitution of a national navy. Germany's
Definition 250
Advantage of an advanced "Front "of operations 251
Illustrations: British Navy, 1793-1815; Bonaparte on the Adige,
1796 251
Strong Places occupied in both instances 252
Application to Caribbean Sea 253
Lines of British strong places to Suez and to Panama 254
Direction of operations in Naval War determined by position of Enemy's
Fleet and Naval Bases 254
Enemy's organized force the primary objective of operations .... 255 The usual great predominance of British Navy in modem times has
caused illustrations of Naval Strategy to be deficient in number . . 255
Consequent faulty expression : " The Sea brooks only one Mistress *'. . 256
Incorrectness of this shown by instances 256
Fluctuations in Mediterranean campaigns, 1793-1798 256
Renewed instance in 1799 261
Mediterranean Campaigns demonstrate need of local bases 261
Likewise Suffren's Campaigns in East Indies 261
Balance of Naval Forces in War of American Independence .... 262
Predominance at Sea necessary for attack on a fortified naval base . . 263 Effect of Distance. Consequent need of advanced bases in distant
operations 264
Attack upon an Enemy's Base may be the best defence for one's own
local interests 265
Embarrassment caused to a Battle Fleet by the presence of Supply
Vessels 266
Necessity for untiring pursuit of a retreating Enemy 266
Instances of ill-effect of lax pursuit 267
Relations of Japanese and Russian Fleets before Tsushima summarized 268
Conduct of a Pursuit when sight of chase has been lost 270
Attack upon a fortified base a means to compel an Enemy's Fleet to
battle 271
Gibraltar. Trincomalee 272
Embarrassment of an assailant Fleet when confronted by two hostile
ports, suitably placed and fortified 272
A single port with widely separated approaches resembles two ports.
Vladivostok 272
Desirable positions for battle 273
Procedure for superior navy confronted with two widely separated hostile
bases 273
CONTENTS XV
Procedure of a navj whooe sncceBses, with conBeqaent lengthened lines
of commanication, hare entailed loss of superiority 274
Front of Operations to be maintained as far in advance as practicable . 274
Instances : Bonaparte on Adige, 1796; British at Corsica, 1794-1796 . 275
Arrest of Progress : How to be utilized 276
Procedare of a Fleet reduced to the Defensiye 277
" Defence the Stronger Form of War/' discussed 277
Enterprises of Rozhestvensky and Cervera classified as Offensive . . . 278
Disadvantage of Defensive in that it prompts to dissemination of force 279
Elements essential to a serious defence 280
Advantage of national nearness to the positions to be defended . . . 280
Part borne bj strong places in a defensive campaign 281
Fortified Positions in a given region should be neither too many, nor
too few 282
Especially necessary to maintenance of national control in a remote
maritime region 283
Should be independent of protection by Navy 283
Embarrassment of a Fleet charged with covering important but defence- less positions. Illustration 284
Bonaparte and Mantua, 1796. Analogy to an external Maritime Theatre
of War 285
Mantua and Bonaparte respectively illustrate Defensive and Offensive
as Forms and Methods of War < 285
Difference in Control of strong places over movements of armies and
of fleets. A Question of Communications 286
Bonaparte at Mantua compared with Nelson at Copenhagen .... 286
Movements of Betreating and Pursuing Armies in the field ..... 287
Analogies in Maritime Warfare drawn from Nelson's career .... 288 Movements of Inferior Fleet when in presence of an advancing superior
enemy 289
Fleet and fortified ports to be considered as two parts of one whole . . 290 Bianagement of an Inferior Fleet, defending a Maritime Region, and
resting upon Fortified Harbors 291
In such cases, the method of the Fleet of the defensive is to take the
offensive 293
Blnstration: John Rodgers' Squadron in 1812 293
Enemy's communications and external interests indicate the objective
of such operations 294
Clamor of Interests for protection. The '* Flying Squadron " in 1898 . 295
"Displacement of Force" 295
Quotation from Daveluy 295
The Problem, to convert Inferiority into Superiority 296
Japan and Russia 297
Value of Experience in applying Principles 297
Real Experience not confined to Personal Experience 297
Quotations from Archduke Charles and from Napoleon 297
xvi CONTENTS
Comment on these qaotations 298
The Condnct of War not a Science, bnt an Art 299
Contrast between Science and Art 299
Maxims of War. Quotation from Jomini 300
Reflections 300
Apothegm of Napoleon 801
CHAPTER XI Appuoation to thb Guur of Mxxico and thb Cuubbban Sba
This Study of Golf and Caribbean assumes equality of Naval Force
between opponents 302
Study, therefore, one of Positions only 302
Necessity to define the limits of a strategic theatre studied 302
Also, of considering decisive natural features 302
Reasons determining the limits of theatre now under consideration . . 303 Two principal points of interest, the Mouth of the Mississippi and the
Isthmus of Panama 303
Political considerations affecting conditions 305
Commercial considerations in International Politics 306
Boundaries of theatre under discussion 308
Entrances to it 308
Military importance of Straits and other Waterways 309
Commanding military Position of Jamaica 310
Comparatiye military unimportance of Gulf of Mexico west of Yucatan
and the Biississippi 311
Lines of Reference for proposed study 312
Points of Strategic Importance enumerated 313
Acquisitions of the United States after War with Spain 314
Military effbct of these 815
Discussion of the relative value of the enumerated Points, as regards
their positions 315
Effect of the Florida Peninsula 316
Positional value of Key West 317
Analogies to be observed between the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific
CoasU of the United States 319
Positional influence of Long Island and Sound 320
Disposition of a navy having Two fortified Bases on same coast . . . 320 Discussion continued of positional value of enumerated Strategic Posi- tions in Gulf and Caribbean 321
Continuous Obstacle to passage of vessels presented by Cuba and Haiti 323 Consequent mUitary importance of the one break at the Windward
Passage 323
Parallel Instances 323
Command of such passages secured by a competent navy resting on an
adjacent Base 325
CONTENTS xvii
Inflaence of a Fleet so controlling Windward Fassage npon a hostile force
attempting to operate at the Isthmns 326
Best positions for controlling Windward Passage. Santiago, Gnanta-
namo, and Jamaica contrasted in this respect 327
Importance of communications, especially for coal in contemporary
Nayal War 328
Positional military effect of Coba and Haiti analyzed 328
Military influence of the United States at the Isthmns wonld be nullified
by possession of Cuba by an enemy of equal naral force 331
Consequent inference as to necessary size of United States Nary . . . 332
Support to such a navy given by Key West, Guantanamo, and Cnlebra 332 Position of Havana superior in control to that of Santiago and of
Guantanamo 333
Mutual support of Havana and Santiago owing to land communication 333
Strategic and Tactical Characteristics of Seaports 334
Harbors of refuge on Cuban Coast, both north and south, between
Santiago and Havana 335
Cienfuegos considered, strategically and tactically 335
Foul ground about Cienf ugoe often advantages for defence by Torpedo
Vessels and Submarines 336
Contrasted in this respect with Heligoland 336
Heligoland, strategic value and tactical dispositions 337
Ports very dose to each other should be comprised in a single scheme
of defence 338
Bahama Banks and Channel considered strategically 338
British use of Bahama Channel in attack upon Havana, 1762 .... 339 Close of discussion of military features of Cuba, as distinguished from
its strategic relations to other parts of Caribbean and Gulf . . . 339
CHAPTER Xn
The Gulf of Mexico and Caxibbsan Sba
( Concluded)
Consideration of the Extension of Cuban Influence over Caribbean by
naval power 340
Three Principal Centers of operations in the Caribbean 340
Extent of control conferred by possession of Cuba alone, granted
adequate naval force 340
Measures necessary to extend control to Mona Passage 340
Control of Mona Passage to be exercised by cruisers only 341
Blnstration of effect of leaving Windward Passage unguarded, drawn
from War with Spain, 1898 341
Strategic effect of wireless telegraphy 343
Positions suitable for controlling Mona Passage 343
Lines of sea communications should not be too long 344
xviii CONTENTS
Effect npon question of commniiicationB produced bj the acquiBition of
GnaDtanamo and Cnlebra 344
CoDseqaent local advantag^e of United States over European countries 345 Policy of acquiring remote naval stations. Hong Kong. Kiao Chau.
Port Arthur. Gibraltar 345
True military policy of United States as to ports in Haiti. Instances
of Malta and Port Arthur 346
Influence of Cuba over the Gulf and Caribbean summarized .... 346 Three principal objects to be controlled in the Carribean : 1. Entrance ; 2. IMndpal objectives of commerce or war ; 3. Transit from entrances
to objectives 347
Discussion in detail of these objects 348
General discussion of question of transit in ocean or narrow seas . . . 351 Poiuts of departure and arrival considered with reference to their re- spective strategic significance 352
Ulnstrations from history. Nelson. Togo 353
Effect of British methods npon Napoleon's combinations 354
Effect of nearby seaports npon lines of communication 354
Jamaica contrasted in this respect with Cuba 355
With the lesser Antilles 355
Cuba with the Antilles 355
Predominant positional value of Jamaica 3.56
Deduction to be made from this value owing to distance from supports 357
Advantage of Cuba in this respect 358
Result of these disadvantages to Jamaica 359
Danger attending an attempt to combine forces starting from two far
separated positions 360
Instance: Russia in War with Japan 361
Strategic advantages of Cuba as regards her Communications .... 361
Corresponding disadvantage of Jamaica 362
Value of fortified ports instanced by Jamaica 362
Jamaica affords an illustration of the interest of the United States in
European international conditions 363
Estimate of the value of the Lesser Antilles as bases for operations in
the Carribean 363
Conclusions as to the comparative strategic values of Cuba, Jamaica, and
the Lesser Antilles 365
End of General Discussion of strategic features of the Caribbean . . 367
Specific Application to the United States' interests in the Caribbean . 367
Method pursued in this application 367
Contrasts between 1911 and 1887, the date of the first writing .... 367
Close connection between strategy and international relations .... 368
Contrast between international and naval conditions in 1887 and 191 1 . 368 Contrast between positions held by the United States in the Gulf and
Caribbean in 1687, and in 1911 372
Positional importance of Key West 374
•
CONTENTS xix
Page
Weaknessof the United States' base on the Golf as stated in 1887 . . 375
Remedy then indicated 376
Changes since 1887, affecting adyantageonsly the influence of the United
States in the Caribbean 377
Development of Key West in this interval 377
Advantages of Gnantanamo and Kej West contrasted 378
Their relations : of mntnal support, and as affecting operations, offensive
and defensive 379
Strategic effect of a fleet resting on Gnantanamo as a centre, with
supports at Key West and Culebra 380
Comparative ineffectiveness of Raids, whether on land or sea .... 380 Summary of the effect of the changes of tenures in the Caribbean, in the
past twenty years 381
Positive and negative effect upon naval operations due to introduction
of Steam 381
Illustration of requirements of modem naval strategy afforded by the
Caribbean Sea and the Isthmus of Panama 381
Relation of the Isthmtis and Canal to mutual support of the Atlantic
and Pacific coasts 382
The Caribbean Sea the Key to the Atlantic and Pacific 382
CHAPTER Xni
Discussion of tbb Russo-Japanbsb Was
Yalue of the subject of this chapter to Naval Strategy 383
Errors and defects elicit fuller material for illustration of principles than
successes do 383
Reasons and Instances 384
Russian conduct of the war, therefore, first chosen for discussion . . . 384
"Fortress Fleet "and "Fleet in Being" 385
Correct method of dealing with opposing conceptions 385
" Compromise" and " Adjustment" discussed, in relation to ship designs
and to campaign plans 386
Essential characteristics of " Compromise " 387
* Exdusiveness of Purpose " the mental opposite of *' Compromise " . . 387
Illustration, from opposite systems of Mountain and River Defedee . . 388
Necessity for precision in thought, and in use of words 389
Precise meaning of "Combination" 390
Impression produced by the word " Compromise " 390
The Armored Cruiser a compromise 391
" Fortress Fleet " a RuRsian conception 391
Illustration : Port Arthur and Vladivostok 391
General effect of this conception upon Russian practice 392
Russian national bias towards defensive 393
XX CONTENTS
"Fortress Fleet ** and "Fleet in Being" represent, respectiyely* defen- sive and offensive ideas 393
Fftrticular effect of the Russian conception upon the method of:
1. Assembling the fleet in the Far East 393
2. In distributing it there, when aMembled 394
Warning herein against the distribution of United States Battle Fleet
between Atlantic and Pacific 395
Relative strategic valnee of Port Arthur and Vladivostok in this War . 396 Characteristically defensive attitude and action of Russian Fort Arthur
fleet 397
Ineffective result 398
Position at Vladivostok would indicate offensive purpoise 398
"Fleet in Being" theory. Probable influence upon Rozhestvensky's
action . 398
Non-acceptance by Japanese indicated by their general course .... 399
The risk is not ignored, yet accepted 400
Military " Security " not identical with Peace security 400
"Possible "not the military equivalent of "actual" 401
A successful raid not the equivalent of communications cut 402
Capture at sea of a Japanese siege train 402
Similar mishap to Bonaparte before Acre 402
Effect of the Russian conception of a Fortress Fleet upon the manage- ment of the Port Ajrthur division 403
Discussion of the management of that division on its attempted escape
from Port Arthur, August 10, 1904 404
Opposing conditions: to be harmonized, not by compromise, but by
adjustment 405
Sayings of Nelson applicable to the case 406
Compromise in the Russian action between ideas of escape and fighting 407
Vicious result 407
Kamimura's Action with Russian cruisers, August 14 407
Diacussion of proper management of the Russian division at Vladivostok 408
CHAPTER XIV
Discussioir OF thb Russo-Japanbsb War
{Concluded)
Rozhestvensky's conduct of his division 409
Singleness of conception the standard of measurement 409
Enters the strategic theatre of the naval war 409
Embarrassments of Rozheetvensky 410
Statements from Semenoff's "Rasplata" 410
Question as to amount of coal carried when starting on final stage . . 411
Effect upon Rozhestvensky of warnings from St Petersburg . . . . 411
Effect of Port Arthur mismanagement upon Rozheetvensky *8 prospects 412
CONTENTS xxi
General militaxy lesson dedaoed 412
Qaestion of a snrrender; when jastified 413
Command of the sea the decisive and unifying consideration in this war 413 Bozhestvensky's prohlem, therefore, essentially that of the Russian
Port Arthur fleet 414
Inferences as to proper procedure deducihle from this consideration . .414
Essential requirement to obtain battle under favorable conditions . . 414
Bozhestvensky's course of procedure 415
Lack of singleness of aim 416
Indications 417
Contrast with Ranke's remark concerning William III of England . .417
Specific application to Roihestvensky's problem 417
The question of the supply vessels 419
Perplexity between opposing requirements. Compromise and Adjust- ment 419
Discussion of Bozhestvensky's course 420
Illustrative quotation from Lanfrey's Napoleon 421
Japanese Naval Strategy 421
Perplexing and harassing conditions encountered 421
Necessity not to risk battleships, unless for a decisive object 422
Bisk actually assumed in the general plan of campaign 422
Measures to obtain control of sea, by the navy numerically inferior . . 422
Singleness of aim observable for this object. Primary measures . . . 423
Subsequent procedure evinces the same unity of conception 424
Tactical measures, to insure the strategic purpose of controlling the
hostile fleet 425
Strategic success of these measures by thwarting Bussian escape to
Vladivostok 426
Strat^c and other reasons for Kamimura^s position in Straits of
Tsushima 426
General correctness of Japanese procedure 427
Light shed by it on the "Fleet in Being "theory 428
Necessity for taking risks 430
Napoleon quoted 430
Nelson quoted 431
CHAPTER XV
Bblatioks oy Coast Fortiyications to Natal Stbatbot
Seacoast Fortresses on border line between military and naval . . . 432
Consequent inevitable clash of opinions 432
Analysis of the functions of fleets and fortresses in mixed naval and
military operatiouB 433
In such operations, the function of sea-coast fortress, by harboring fleets,
is essentially offensive 434
xxii CONTENTS
Consequent necessitj for fortification on the land side 435
Ships at a disadvantage contending against forts 435
In remote seas, coast fortresses are necessary even to a supreme naval
power 436
Gibraltar, Alexandria, Malta 436
Strategic effect of several harbors on the same coast 437
Necessity of coast fortresses on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the
United States 438
Inflaence upon the moyements of a fleet due to the security of its bases 438 Determinative influence of Fort Arthur upon the war between Japan
and Russia 439
Strategic conditions possible to be produced by similar use of Vladivostok 439 Conditions resulting from stationing Russian fleet at Port Arthur in- stead of at Vladivostok 441
The fleet there subservient to fortress, in accordance with mistaken
principle 441
Russian indisposition to offensive naval action 441
Imperative necessity for Japan to destroy the Russian fleet, before the
arrival of reinforcement 442
Effect of this necessity upon the land campaign 442
Russian plan of campaign on land 443
Comparison with the action in 1 797 of the Archduke Charles, commended
by Bonaparte 443
The tenure of Port Arthur an essential feature of Russian plan . . . 444
Delay obtained important, even though Port Arthur ultimately fell . . 444
Comparison with Genoa in 1880 445
The Russian plan a true combination : Two parts, but one action . . 445
Causes of failure 445
Navies needed by nations that have little shipping engaged in foreign
commerce. Russia and United States 446
External interests not limited to commerce and navigation 446
In a representative government, maritime interests afford legislative
support to a navy 447
Oversea interests and problems of the United States 447
INDEX 449
LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS
I Plan, illustrating advantages of central position • . Page 34
II Strategic sitoation at Plevna, 1877 << 86
in Bonaparte's central position at Castiglione, 1796 " 46
IV Campaign in Germany, June to October, 1796 . . << 58
y Dutch and English naval movements in Medi- terranean, 1653-1654 ^ 70
VI Dutch and English in English Channel, 1652-1653 . " 72
VII Map of Central and Western Europe, illustrating
campaigns, 1630-1713 " 94
Vni Athenian expedition against Syracuse, b.c. 415 . . << 230
IX Map of Spain and Portugal, illustrating situation in 1812, with march and retreat of Sir John Moore in 1808-1809 « 248
X Map of Mediterranean, to illustrate naval cam- paigns, 1793-1798 "260
XI Map of Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea ... « 382
XII Plan, showing opposing methods of defending several
passes, or fords « 388
XIII Scene of Naval War between Japan and Bussia " 426
, '
NAVAL STRATEGY
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY
THE lectures on Naval Strategy, which in re» vised and expanded form are to be read before yon during the present Conference of the College (1909), were written first in 1887; being used in tiie session of that autumn and again in 1888. Upon this followed the dissolution of the College as a separate institution by Secretary Whitney ; but both at the Torpedo Station, with which the College was tempo- rarily merged, and again after its restoration to distinct existence by Secretary Tracy in 1892, the lectures have continued to be read from year to year up to the present, either by myself or by another officer.
From time to time, during this period, substantial addi- tions have been made to the text, but there was no attempt to recast the substance of the lectures. The fittmework continued as at first, — a statement of principles. It was chiefly in illustration, either from history, or from a recon- sideration of contemporary political conditions, that addi- tion or change was made. All these modifications, also, were occasional, even casual. When a thought occurred as apt, it was jotted down ; but at no time was methodical revision undertaken, nor would it have been now save for the suggestion, first, of Rear Admiral Luce, the father of the College, and afterwards of Rear Admiral Merrell,
2 NAVAL STRATEGY
president of the College in 1908, when this revision was begun.
From first writing to formal revision, therefore, twenty- one years elapsed; the term from birth to majority. During that time the growth of matter in the lectures was confined to^ such incidental development as has been stated above. The attempt at systematic revision, now to be made, prompts naturally some reflection upon the changes in conditions in the intervening period, by which the conduct of war has been affected.
The most notable of these changes are external to the subject of Naval Strategy in itself; and necessarily sa They affect it much; but they do so from the outside. Based as Naval Strategy is upon fundamental truths, which, when correctly formulated, are rightly called prin- ciples, these truths, when ascertained, are in themselves unchangeable ; but it by no means follows that in elucida- tion and restatement, or by experience in war, new light may not be shed upon the principles, and new methods introduced into their application. This will constitute development ; alike in the practice of Naval Strategy, and in that statement of its laws and principles which we call theory. The physical sciences supply us here with apt analogies. The laws governing them, for example elec- tricity, are immutable ; but, in the application of the laws, the lifetime of a generation testifies how great modification and progress are possible. They are possible, and are effected, through many minds acting upon them, and through numerous experiments being made; the analogy to which, in our profession of war, is the experience of warfare.
It seems appropriate here to mention, if only incidentally, certain changes in the weapons with which war is waged. Especially to be noted are the disappearance of the ram from consideration, as a weighty factor in tactics ; and, on
INTRODUCTORY 8
the other hand, the progress of the submarine, the im- mensely increased range of the automobile torpedo, and the invention of wireless telegraphy. In 1887, the effective range of the torpedo was reckoned at little over five hun- dred yards ; the submarine, although a well-developed con- ception of long standing, had scarcely come to be taken into account as a practical factor ; and wireless telegraphy was unheard of, — at least by the public. In the very first course of lectures delivered by me at the College, in 1886, before these now under consideration were begun, I sug- gested, as a possibility for a fleet blockading the United States coast, that the separate squadrons, say before New York, the Delaware, and the Chesapeake, could be kept in communication by a submarine cable.^ That was probably practicable ; but the same end is now assured much more quickly, more readily, and more certainly by the wireless. On the other hand, the submarine and the greater range of the torpedo will place a far greater strain on blockaders, and compel them to keep at a much greater distance. These consequences will not change the principles of strategy, but they will affect the application of it. An illustration of this has been afforded by the Japanese battleships taking position sixty miles from Port Arthur, which they were watching, at the Elliott Islands, and by the elaborate provision made against torpedo attack even there ; while other measures insured their probably reach- ing the scene betimes, if the enemy undertook to come out. As to the effect of wireless, Togo could await Rozhestvensky where he did, at anchor, because wireless assured him of the shorter line in order to reach the point of interception. Could he have known of the enemy's approach only through a scouting system which, though itself equally good, was dependent upon flags or lights for transmitting information, he might have had to keep nearer the line of
1 •< Inflneiice of Sea Power upon Hiitoij," p. 86.
4 NAVAL STRATEGY
the enemy's route, at the probable disadvantage of remam* ing at sea. This does not affect the well-recognized, ancient, strategic principle of the value of interior lines ; but it does seriously modify its application, and appears to me a new confirmation of Jomini's dictum that changes in weapons affect practice, but not principles.
As contributions to development, neither experience of war, nor the treatment of war by professional writers, has been wanting to the twenty-one years now immediately under consideration. In the matter of experience there have been three wars, in whic^ navies have borne an active part: between China and Japan, in 1894; between the United States and Spain, in 1898 ; and between Japan and Russia, in 1904-1905. Equally obvious, although not equally on the surface, may be cited the war between Great Britain and the Boer Republics in Africa. The British Navy, as navy, did not fire a gun ; but, in the apparent tem- per of Europe, the decisive superiority of the British fleet to any probable combination against it assured the control of the sea, and with it the necessary transportation of force, beyond chance of interruption. We have but to consider the recent revelations of German naval progress, and their effect upon British feeling, in order to realize what the anxieties of Great Britain would be a few years hence, with a like war on her hands, and the German navy what it promises then to be. Naval Strategy is being elucidated, and is developing ; but we are not yet in sight of the time when it will be antiquated.
A proof that it is still in the vigor of its prime, and an early prime at that, is to be found in the change in the distribution of navies which has taken place since these lectures were first written. We all recall — there is scarcely one here so young as not to recall — the distribu- tion of our own fleet twenty years ago: the European squadron; the Asiatic squadron } the Pacific squadron,
INTRODUCTORY 5
etc This was no specialty of the United States, but was reflected in all the great services. Police duty, it was called, and quite accurately ; for the distribution was that of police, not that of a military organization calculated for military use. So American ships, and those of other nar tions, were dotted singly around the world, in separate ports ; with single beats, like that of a policeman.
How changed present conditions, how entirely concen- tration— which is military — has taken the place of disper- sion, it is needless to insist. This is an effect of Naval Strategy, adapted to changes in conditions ; but it is fair, in drawing attention to the change, to repeat that the principles of Naval Strategy have not altered. They have merely received elucidation by experience and by reflection. Men's minds have turned — it will be more accurate to say, have returned — to ideas and practices which were familiar enough to our predecessors, who had been to school to War itself; but which, in the absence of that most excellent instructor, had lapsed out of mind. This return has been due partly to the wars we have mentioned ; partly to obvious changes in international relations; but largely also, beyond question, to the appreciation of the bearing which the sea and the control of it have in war, and to the consequent consideration — reflection — how best to use naval power, a mental process which this recognition of its value has prompted and sustained.
Such use of naval power is naval strategy, whether applied in peace or war; and the study of naval strategy, systematically, began here at the Naval War College. There was plenty of naval strategy before ; for in war the oommon sense of some, and the genius of others, sees and properly applies means to ends; and naval strategy, like naval tactics, when boiled down, is simply the proper use of means to attain ends. But in peace, as in idleness, such matters drop out of mind, unless systematic provision is
6 NAVAL STRATEGY
made for keeping them in view. For this purpose this College was founded; and if it had produced no other i^esult than the profound realization by naval officers of the folly of dividing the battle-fleet, in peace or in war, it would by that alone have justified its existence and paid its expenses. It is known that the decision of the General Board, that it was inexpedient to divide the battle fleet between the two oceans, was largely influenced by the ex- perience of the war games played here. I had this from the late Admiral Sperry, whose recent death the Navy still deplores. It is well to remember continually that the Senate of the United States, in the year 1909, adopted a recommendation to the President for the division of the present battle-fleet between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. So distributed, the division in each ocean would have been decisively inferior to a foreign battle-fleet there present ; to which fleet the two would have been equal or superior, if united. No more convincing instance exists, to my knowledge, of the need of statesmen and people to know something about the A, B, C of Naval Strategy ; for this principle, of concentration, is the A, B, C. Like the A, B of the Greeks, which gave its name to the whole of their alphabet and ours, concentration sums up in itself aU the other factors, the entire alphabet, of military efficiency in war. In another way, Napoleon expressed this in a notable saying: *^ Exclusiveness of purpose is the secret of great successes. '* Exclusiveness of purpose means concentration of the will upon one object to the exclusion of others. There is thus a concentration of mental and moral outiook, of resolution, as real as the physical concentration of dis- posable forces ; and when the moral prepossession exists in a military man the physical concentration will follow, as surely as any effect follows upon its cause.
To illustrate the permanence of considerations affecting naval strategy, considerations which are not so much
INTRODUCTORY 7
principles as the outflow of principles, bearing to principles the relation which fruit bears to its tree, three incidents may be cited, which, though widely separated in time, and in superficial conditions, are closely related through the principle common to them all
1. Nelson, over a hundred years ago, on his last visit to England, when the public mind was greatly excited about an anticipated action between a British fleet under Calder and a much superior hostile body, said, ^^This I freely venture, that, when they shall have beaten Calder, they will give England no further trouble this year." What he meant was, that the enemy as well as Calder would be re- moved from the board, and that Great Britain's reserve forces would still dominate the situation.
2. Nearly ninety years afterward, at the opening of the College session in 1892, 1 had occasion, with reference to the obsolescence of ships of war, to quote a then contem- porary opinion, which I believe to have been perfectly just. The quotation ran thus: The last expression of foreign professional opinion, concerning these so-called obsolete ships, is that, in the later stages of a war, when the newest ships have undergone their wear and received their hammering, the nation which then can put forward the laigest reserve of ships of the older types will win.
8. This leads by a direct line of precedent to a contem- porary instance, an interesting illustration of an historical series, cohering in teaching, from Nelson's seventy-fours to to-day's Dreadnoughts. In the excited debate of March, 1909, in the British Parliament, concerning German naval rivalry, it was assumed on all hands that the number of German Dreadnoughts would nearly equal that of British three years later. On this menacing fact there was general agreement, although estimates differed in detail. But, to- wards the end of the debate, the Prime Minister asserted, and in my opinion justly, that though in Dreadnoughts
8 NAVAL STRATEGY
alone the forces might be perilously near equality in num- ber, the great superiority of Great Britain in her second line of ships would yet secure her command of the sea. For, when the two fleets of Dreadnoughts parted, no mat- ter which won, they, like Calder and Villeneuve in 1805, would be removed from the board for the time being, — Nelson's ^^ this year," — and the reserve would come into play.
The principle from which the same conclusion flowed at these three successive epochs is that of keeping a superior force at the decisive point; expressed in the homely phrase of getting there first with the most men. This again is con- centration, timely concentration ; the A, B, C, of strategy, moving on to the D, E, F. The value of a reserve consti- tuted the decisive &ctor in the three estimates quoted. A reserve, if correctly constituted in numbers and in position, enables you at a critical moment to be first on hand with the largest force; to concentrate j at the decisive period of a battle or of a campaign. It is one method among many to insure superiority of numbers, each method adapted to its particular conjuncture. The consideration of a reserve enforces a judicious abstinence from *^ scrapping " vessels prematurely, a process which by its effect on a campaign is strategical in its character. If the Russians in the late war with Japan had properly mastered and applied the function of a reserve, if their national method of naval reasoning had not been utterly vitiated by their prevalent theories of a fortress-fleet, they at Port Arthur wouldx have reasoned as did Nelson in 1805: When Togo shall have wiped out the Port Arthur division he will be in no con- dition to do further harm for some time, and Rozhestvensky can proceed safely. The clear duty of the Port Arthur di- vision was an engagement so desperate as to leave the field clear for the reserves. Japan had none ; Russia had. If ever a nation took its fortune in both hands and threw it
INTRODUCTORY 9
overboard, Bussia did 80 in the late war with Japan ; and by Russia is meant, not the helpless, irresponsible mass of the population, but the men who in Russia bore to the govern- ment the same relation that some of those here present to- day may bear some time to the Government of the United States. To such men was due the &ilure of Russia ; and in consequence the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, through the inability of Russia to assert her- self. This weakness of Russia, traceable to feeble naval management five years before, has relieved Germany from the menace of Russia on her eastern frontier, and thus has aided that growth of the German Navy which tends to revolutionize international conditions in both hemispheres.
It is trite to remark that a bare assemblage of principles, although useful to an expert, to steady him in moments of doubt or perplexity, can serve little to a novice, who has not clothed them with illustrations drawn from personal experience; or, as in the above instances, from history, which is the experience of others, recorded for our use. To a man so unequipped, principles, however sound, are mere statements resting on external authority, unsupported by the inner conviction and appreciation which alone sup- ply strength in the hour of need. The situation at Copenha- gen, wrote Nelson at a certain moment, looks to the novice in war more formidable than it is. That is the statement, and the illustration, of personal experience applied to a present condition and problem. It is a statement, general in char- acter, of the intuitive ability which practice gives to size up a situation. The French call it c<mp ffoeil — at a glance. Napoleon has said : On the field of battle the happiest in- spiration— again coup ffcsil — is often only a recollection. This is a testimony to the value of historical illustration, which is simply recorded experience ; for, whether the rec- ollection be of what some other man did, or whether it be of some incident one's self has seen and recalls, it draws
10 NAVAL STRATEGY
upon the past ; and that, too» not in a general way, but by specific application to an instant emergency, comprehended at a glance, just because it is familiar.
The two sayings complement each other. Nelson affirms the value of experience — which is History in the making — to develop the faculty of quickly and accurately estimating a situation. Napoleon states the value of History — which is experience recorded — in supplying precedents, available for particular use in a particular emergency. One remark is general, the other specific. Corbett, in his ^^ Seven Tears' War," a work I commend heartily to you, notes the careful comments which Wolfe, the conqueror of Quebec, made upon the military movements at which he was present as a subordinate ; preserving the record of his own experience to sustain him in his future and triumphant career as com- mander-in-chief. But the man who thus records his own observations has the temper which collects observations from history also ; the temper of the student. When Por- ter's flotilla was caught above the &lls of the Red River, in 1864, by the lowering of the stream, he was fortunate in having at hand men who had had experience in similar conditions. The building of the dam, and the consequent saving of the vessels, was not due to inspiration, but to experience and recollection.
Principle and illustration thus react, the one upon the other, and this interaction shows the necessity of both. The man who possesses the principle is able at a glance to understand the illustration ; to appreciate its value. In a paper on Naval Strategy, by Admiral Luce, published by our Naval Institute, he cites the following words of Lord Wolseley, writing about the American War of Secession : ** I am struck throughout the whole story of the minor oper- ations of this period by the iUtutratiani they afford of the regularity with which the old principles of war assert their supremacy " ; and he specifies two instances, saying, ^^ Both
INTRODUCTORY U
failed, 0$ might have been predicted.^ On the other hand, the man who, with the principle in his possession, sees for the first time an incident of war, an illustration, thenceforth holds the principle more firmly; because he understands it better. The principle" that fire bums is better understood by a burnt child after he has received the illustration of being burned; while the man who profits by his observation of the effects of burning upon another man shows the value of intelligent notice of what gfoes on around him. There is such a thing as seeing another come to grief, yes, even to destruction, without being one whit wiser yourself, because you do not understand how it happened ; and you do not understand, either because you do not see the principle he has violated, or because you miss the application of it in his case, and consequently to your own.
To illustrate : When the Senate passed the recommenda- tion to divide our battle-fleet between our Atlantic and Pacific coasts, not four years had elapsed since the Russian fleet had been destroyed by the Japanese, owing chiefly to its being divided between the Baltic and Asiatic coasts of Russia. The principle of concentration had been recklessly violated ; although superior in aggregate force, the Russians continued throughout to be last to arrive and with the few- est men. A man acquainted with the principles of Strategy, and with its illustrations in past history, should have had no need of this additional instance to show him the error of the Russian procedure, — an error which seemingly arose from underrating their enemy, for the exposure was prob- ably due rather to carelessness than ignorance ; but to men unacquainted with the principle the new illustration was utterly wasted. They saw their neighbor burned without the slightest idea how it happened ; and, like a child not yet burned, undertook with a light heart to expose their country to the same risk.
Therefore, let no man fall into the mistake of under-
12 NAVAL STRATEGY
yaloing military study ; for study is simply the intelligent observation of incidents, of events, and drawing from them conclusions which we call principles. This is what science does ; and the larger our number of illustrations — observa- tions— the surer are our inferences. The past has done much for us. That wliich we call history has recorded illustrations, and from those illustrations has formulated principles, ready for our use. It is for us to carry these on; to apply them for action to our own circumstances ; and to note how results are affected, as principles are followed or violated, whether by ourselves or others.
Among naval officers, such active interest in current events and in past events has developed greatiy since these lectures were first written. The consequence has been the amassing of a large amount of material for study, previ- ously unformulated or undigested. In illustration of this development permit me to quote again from the address de- livered by me in 1892 when the College reopened in its new building. I said : *^ Not only during the time I was actually resident here, 1886-1888, but in the four years which have since elapsed, I have made a practice of sending for the catalogues of the leading military and naval booksellers, at home and abroad, and carefully scanning their contents. Whatever could be found bearing in any way on the Art of Naval War I have had ordered for the College library; with the result that a single one of the short book shelves you can see downstairs contains all that we have to show on the subject of Naval Tactics ; and of that space nearly one-half is occupied with elaborate treatises upon the tactics of sailing ships, from Paul Hoste to Chopart.^' In this remark I added nothing concerning Naval Strategy ; for, outside of occasional papers, of the nature of magazine arti- cles, there was no formal treatise except Colomb's ^ Naval Warfare," published in 1890. Reliance for principles had to be entirely upon works devoted to land strategy.
INTRODUCTORY 18
I am not prepared to say that in the production of elab- orate formal treatment of Naval Strategy there has been in these twenty-one years the kind of advance which shows itself in large numbers of books. Formal treatment of Land Strategy is much older; and we would not need a great increase in the number of our fingers to count up the books upon it Those which by general acclaim can be called standards are necessarily fewer stilL But, aside from production in writing, there are signs sufficient of an inter- est so enlarged as to indicate the working of the leaven of study in all countries. The distribution of the fleets itself bears witness to the prevalence of sounder habits of thought ; and the recognition of the necessity of formal study has been shown in the institution by other nations of courses resembling those of this College. Greater attention is being paid to considerations of Naval Strategy at the head- quarters, in the administrations which correspond to our Navy Department. The redistribution of duties in the British Board of Admiralty, by the Order in Council of August, J904, bears the impress of this change ; the duties concentrated by it in the hands of the First Sea Lord are essentially strategic in function.
Of books, however, there have been no lack, to testify to the widespread interest felt. Speaking only of the two languages familiar to me, French and English, I think it a moderate statement that thirty years ago works like those of Darrieus and Daveluy in France, or the historical works of Julian Corbett in England — I refer specifically to his ^England in the Mediterranean'' and <^ England in the Seven Tears' War," — could not have been undertaken. They could not; not because the material for them did not exist, nor yet the brains to utilize the material, but because there was not that general interest which brings the brains and the material into fruitful contact. That the Oerman naval mind has been as active in this direction as might
14 NAVAL STRATEGY
have been anticipated from the deyelopment of military science in the nation I know well ; among other ways by works kindly sent me. I have continually to regret an unacquaintance with the language which at my age has barred me from this source of professional profit.
If, as I think is true, this College had a large part in originating this professional movement, it will be interest- ing to trace that part backward, up stream, to any one of its several sources. As you all know, the College owed its foundation to the urgency of Admiral Luce with the Navy Department. Among the reasons which moved him to undertake and persevere in this was his personal experi- ence of the lack of military perception, of amp cTceU^ in the administration of the Department which conducted the War of Secession. Months of time, hundreds of lives, and millions of dollars had been expended in the direct frontal attack upon Charleston Harbor by the army and the moni- tors, one of which was under his command, with the effect, among other incidents, of reducing Fort Sumter to a shapeless mass of ruins ; but the city, though shattered by bombardment, still held out, and the flag of the Confeder- acy continued to fly defiantiy over the heap which had been Sumter. Thus things were when Sherman's army arrived at Savannah from Atlanta.
In what follows I quote the Admiral directiy.
^ From the Nantucket (monitor) I was transferred to the command of the Pontiac, and on the 6th of January, 1865, was ordered to report to General Sherman, then in Savan- nah, for duty in Savannah River in connection with the
Army.
**0n reporting at headquarters, General Sherman indi- cated in a few, short, pithy sentences, and by the aid of a map, his plan of campaign from Savannah to the north. General Siocum, commanding the left wing of the army, was to move up to Sister's Ferry, about forty miles above the city, and cross the Savannah Biver by means of a pon-
INTRODUCTORY 16
toon bridge into South Carolina. The object in having a gnnboat (the Pontiac) was that it might go up the river above the ferry in order to protect the pontoon bridge from molestation by the Confederates ; supposed to be in force somewhere in the direction of Augusta. * When I get on solid ground/ he said (for much of that part of the country was inundated), ^somebodv will have to get out of the way I ' And he added, in we pleasant style of banter with wblch he was accustomed to talk to naval officers : * Tou navy fellows have been hammering away at Charleston for the past three years. But just wait till I get into South Carolina; I will cut her communications and Charleston will fall into your hands like a ripe pear.' And that is just what actually came to pass."
^ After hearing General Sherman's clear exposition of the military situation the scales seemed to fall from my eyes. * Here,' I said to myself, * is a soldier who knows ms business I ' It dawned upon me that there were cer- tain fundamental principles underlying military operations which it were well to look into ; principles of general ap- plication, whether the operations were conducted on land or at sea."
*^ Leaving Pocataligo, his army now well in hand. Gen- eral Sherman marched on Columbia and captured the city with little difficulty. This led to the immediate evac- uation of Charleston, February 17, 1865, or a little over three years after capture of Port Royal. Port Royal was the advanced naval base in the waters of South Caro- lina, upon which depended the direct frontal attack upon Charleston."
In connection with the revision of these lectures I have carefully read among other matter the four books — two French and two English — which I have mentioned to you as apt illustrations of the interesting change in the direc- tion of naval thought in thirty years. Darrieus and Daveluy, while indulging copiously in illustrative instances, adopt formally, and to some extent systematically, the method of my own lectures, till now unpublished. That is, they state principles, which they develop by discussion;
16 NAVAL STRATEGY
and then adduce their instances, which illuminate the principles, clothing them as it were with the flesh and blood of living action, which differentiates a live man from a skeleton. In this way, while following the logical coherent method of a consecutive development of principles, enun- ciated as such, a manner of exposition particularly suited to the lucid French intellect and language, they dso pre- serve the historic method for which Daveluy expresses a distinct preference. Thus he says: *^ History, being the .record of experience, if exhaustively studied, brings out all the variable factors which enter war; because History, however imperfect, forgets none of them« History is pho- tographic ; whereas the rational processes,'' — that is, when a man having established a certain basis of truth, builds up his system from that without checking it by history, *^ the rational processes tend to be selective." History, in short, gives you all the qualifying factors; whereas reason, in love with its own refinements, is liable to overlook that which should modify them. In somewhat similar thought. General Sherman once expressed to me a doubt of the value of sham fights ; because, he said, you cannot supply the modifying human factor, of apprehension, and of the other various moral influences which affect militaiy action. Faithful history gives you the whole; and you cannot escape from the effect, or benefit, of this, if you use it con- scientiously. But you approach History with powers de- veloped to appreciate what it gives, if you have beforehand the light which is given by principles, clearly enunciated. Tou come to it provided with standards. For that reason I apprehend that Daveluy and Darrieus, and, so far as they stand the test, my own lectures, form a desirable prepa- ration for works such as those of Corbett, which I have named. Corbett himself has had the advantage, as a mili- tary— or naval — historian, of approaching his subject provided with clearly formulated principles, drawn, as he
INTRODUCTORY 17
contiimallj allows to transpire, from standard military writers. In my own experience, it was thus I approached the study of History as a military record. From Jomini's ^ Art of War," a formal treatise like those of Daveluy and Darrieus, supplemented by his ^History of the Wars of the French Revolution/' in which he gives history accompanied by strategic and tactical discussion of events, I went on to write the course of historicfid lectures which subsequently were published under the title *^The Influence of Sea Power upon History." It was upon this foundation that I then built up the formulation of principles of naval strat- egy contained in the original lectures which are now to be read here in their revised and expanded form. The revi- sion and expansion consist principally in new illustration and some restatement ; not at all in any novelty of princi- ples, though there may be some novelty in application.
I trust that in these remarks, intended chiefly as prelim- inary to the course of lectures on Naval Strategy, I have sufficiently made clear the reciprocal action of principles and of historicfid illustration. Each is a partial educator ; combined, you have in them a perfect instructor. Of the two. History by itself is better than formulated principles by themselves ; for in this connection. History, being the narrative of actions, takes the rOle which we commonly call practical. It is the story of practical experience. But we all, I trust, have advanced beyond the habit of thought which rates the rule of thumb, mere practice, mere personal experience, above practice illuminated by the principles, and reinforced by the knowledge, developed by many men in many quarters. Master your principles, and then ram them home with the illustrations which History furnishes.
In concluding, I wish to draw your attention pointedly to one remark of Corbett's. I expect to use from him several illustrative incidents in due place ; but the remark I here quote bears upon a necessary element of naval
18 NAVAL STRATEGY
strategic thought which used to be not only ignored, but actually discredited and decried. I mean the appreciation of international conditions as an essential factor in all military plans. I will cite an instance, immediately under our eyes. When Germany shall have finished the ships contemplated in the naval programme which she has formally adopted, she will have a navy much superior to that of the United States, unless we change our present rate of building, and also provide more extensive plants. Upon what then will rest the Monroe Doctrine ? and upon what the security of the maintenance of the Panama Canal ? The maintenance of both these depends upon the fleet
The question, if merely one of military force, would be simple: the superior fleet dominates, if the margin of superiority be sufficient. It is the question of political relations which introduces perplexing factors; and the military adviser of a government is not competent to his task, unless, by knowledge of conditions, and practice in weighing them, he can fairly estimate how far inferior numbers may be reinforced by the pressure which other considerations may bring to bear upon a possible enemy. Every naval officer should order his study, and his attention to contemporary events, abroad and at home, by the reflec- tion that he may some day be an adviser of the Govern- ment, and in any case may beneficially affect events by his correct judgment of world-wide conditions.
I have just stated a principle, namely, the necessity of including political — international — conditions in military projects. An illustration, the complement of the principle, is tiie contemporary historical relations of Germany and of the United States to other nations. For instance : there is the solidarity of action between Germany and Austria, lately shown by the pressure of (Germany upon Russia to ignore Great Britain and France, and to recognize the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I can-
INTRODUCTORY 19
not, of course, enter now into an elaborate analysis of all that this German action means, but I can indicate the, to us, important question involved, which is this: If Ger- many should wish to embark her fleet in a transatlantic venture, how far will her relations with other European states permit her to do so? If we had no fleet, doubtless she could afford it. If we have nine ships to her ten she probably could not so afford ; because the resistance we could put up, whatever the issue, would leave her for the time without a navy to confront Europe. On the other hand, should our Pacific coast citizens precipitate us into a war, or even into seriously strained relations, with Japan, that pressure upon us would add to the force of the German fleet In our long contention with Great Britain, based on the Monroe Doctrine, we made continuous progress up to the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of ten years ago. This registered a success for the Monroe Doctrine, which dur* ing the month just passed (May, 1911) has been ex- plicitly accepted by the British Foreign Minister. Dur- ing all this period our navy was hopelessly inferior to the British ; sometimes ludicrously so. Tet we won out. Why did we? and are we in similarly good condition for a possible contention with the new Power of the Sea ? Where ought Great Britain to stand, in case we have trouble with Germany? and where ought we to stand, in the reverse case?
Corbett's remark is, that in the Seven Years^ War the strength of the British action lay in the fact that one great man, the first Pitt, controlled the naval, the military, and the diplomatic factors. The several conditions were thus weighed, and were harmonized into a common action, to which all contributed their utmost influence in mutual support. The desirability of the result must fix our eyes .upon the fact that in our country it will never be at- tained through one man, but only by the co-operation of
20
NAVAL STRATEGY
Beveral. Those several wiU be statesmen, military men, and naval men; and, in order that their co-operation may be adequate, each must understand the conditions by which the others are controlled. The principle here asserted has received striking recognition in the recent Imperial Con- ference (1911), when the Government of Gi-eat Britain explained the imperial and international situation, as it concerns the common intereste of the Empire, to the min- isters of Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand, sitting in secret session conjointly with the Imperial Defence Committee. Of these common interests the chief is Imperial Defence ; the oi^nization of which thus confessedly depends upon a common understauding of international relations. The often failure of conjoint military and naval operations has been due less to mean jealousy than to lack of such mutual understandings ; and for a due grasp of preparation for war, and for plan- ning war, military men of both services need to be imbued with knowledge of international relations. Those relations do affect the amount of force available in various quaiters, by the several opponents. Thus Darrieus says correctly :
" Every naval project which takes account neither of the foreign relations of a great nation, nor of the material limit fixed by its resources, rests upon a weak and unstable base. Foreign pohcy and strategy are bound together by an inde- structible link." In this connection he quotes the German, Von der Goltz : " Whoever writes on strategy and tactics ought not in bis theories to neglect the point of view of his own people. He should give us a national stititegy, a national tactics."
Now the Monroe Doctiine ifl a point of view of the American people; and no scheme of strategy — such as the numbers and constitution of the fleet — is sound if it neglect this consideration.
My last word to you, then, in these prehminary remarks, is to master, and keep track of, the great cuiTent events in
d
INTRODUCTORY 21
lustoiy contemporaiy with yourself. Appreciate their mean- ing. Your own profession, on its militaiy side, calls of course for your first and closest attention ; but you all will have time enough to read military history, appreciating its teachings, and you can also keep abreast of international relations, to such an extent that when you reach positions of prime responsibility, your glance — your eoup JCceiU to repeat the French idiom, — will quickly take in the whole picture of your country's interests in any emergency, whether that be pressing or remote. In Nelson's phrase, you will be no novice ; and you will not, because you, in your career, as he in his, will have been continually applying the judgment you are then called specially to ex- ercise. Remember also that other expression of Nelson's, ^An officer should have political courage." Political courage, to be well based, requires political knowledge as welL That you may more effectually concentrate upon this necessary knowledge, avoid dissipating your energies upon questions interior to the country ; questions financial, sociological, economical, or what not. The sphere of the navy is international solely. It is this which allies it so closely to that of the statesman. Aim to be yourselves statesmen as well as seamen. The biography and lustoiy of our profession will give you glorious names who have been both. I trust the future may show many such among the sons of this College.
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS
IN considering any theater of actaal or possible war, or of a prospective battlefield, the first and most es- sential thing is to determine what position, or chain of positions, by their natural and inherent advantages affect control of the greatest part of it The reasons which give such control to them should be clearly appreciated by the student, if he is to reach right conclusions himself and afterwards impart them to others.
Thus, in his study of the great theater of war in Germany extending eastward from the Rhine to Bohemia, and north- ward from Switzerland and the Tyrol to and somewhat be- yond the river Main,^ the Archduke Charles of Austria pointed out that the stretch of the Danube from Ulm to Ratisbon was, and, under all the varying changes of tactics due to the development of weapons, always had been for two thousand years the controlling military feature of the country. The party which firmly held it had always come out conqueror in the strife for the control of the whole region. This statement the Archduke supports by several historical instances. The reasons for this decisive effect of this reach of the Danube upon the whole theater of war are these : the river, from its character, is eveiywhere an ob- stacle to the free movement of armies ; it is difficult to cross ; but it is especially difficult between Ulm and Ratis- bon, because the banks are high and precipitous, constitut- ing a defile. This section of the river also is central, not only between the north and south boundaries of the theater
1 See map fadng pege 68.
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 23
of war, but also between the eastern and western fronts, which are the bases of the opposing armies. Uhn is about as far from the Rhine as Radsbon is from Bohemia. Con- sequently, the army which controls the means of passing freely across this obstacle placed in the center of the theater of war, has a decisive advantage over the enemy, who, on whichever side he may be, is cut off from the other ; or, if part of his force is on either side, has difficulty to unite. To this advantage, inherent in the natural condition of things, is to be added that of the numerous bridges cross- ing the Danube in this part of its course, several of which are of a substantial character and heavily fortified. To these points, joined to each other by direct roads along the river, lead also the roads stretching northerly and southerly to different points. In other words, the communications of the country, the lines by which the armies and their trains must move, meet and cross at these bridges. For three hundred years, since the days of Francis L and Charles V., of Richelieu and Louis XIV., to those of the Archduke Charles and of Napoleon, the states of Germany covering these regions were the object of French and Aus- trian effort, seeking to control them in the one interest or the other, and these political efforts had often culminated in war. The theater, therefore, had been the scene of many experiences.
The Archduke Charles will be remembered as a promi- nent Austrian general of the days of Napoleon, but it may not be equally within the memory of all that he was much the ablest of his time, worthy even to contend with the great emperor in person. In 1809, though yielding to Napoleon's superior genius, he retired with honor after a hardly wrung defeat. He had commanded upon this field with conspicuous merit in 1796, when by the cleverness and decision of his movements he got the better of two French armies, together very much exceeding his force,
24 NAVAL STRATEGY
commandeji) the one by Jouidan, the other by Moreau, both exceptionally able generals, but who moved, by the prescribed plan of campaign, the one to the north and the other to the south of the Danube, whereas he him- self fell back upon and held a part of this decisive defile. With the enemy thus separated, he turned hastily upon the northern army (Jourdan), for which his grip of the river gave him every facility, drove it rapidly back along and over the Main to the Rhine again. Then the southern army (Moreau), finding him on its flank and rear, and superior to itself alone, was forced to retreat likewise, pass- ing through the Black Forest instead of to the north of it, as in its advance, and crossing the Rhine at Huning^en and Breisach instead of at Strasbui^, whence it had started but to which it could not return.
In 1809 the Archduke commanded again in this region, — then against Napoleon himself, — and in the meantime the valley of the Danube had twice been the scene of great campaigns by the French ; one under Moreau ending with the well-known battle of Hohenlinden, and later, in 1805, under Napoleon, winding up with the yet more celebrated battle of Austerlitz, in both of which instances the Aus- trians were overwhelmingly defeated* The attention of the Archduke had therefore been strongly drawn to this scene of war, by its own intrinsic interest and by the effect upon the fortunes of his country. His military ability, and the special interest this theater had for him, the practical acquaintance gained by personal command and responsi- bility, and the unusual candor with which he points out his own blunders as well as those of others, whether his enemies or his subordinates, are the guarantee of the worth of his study of strategy based upon and exemplified by this historical field of war. This assurance of its value is doubled by the appreciative notice of Jomini, of whose reputation as a military writer and critic I need not speak,
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 26
who translated and edited the work with notes, the fewness of which shows his substantial agreement with the Arch- dake's opinions.
In former days, I have in these rooms traced out these movements of the campaign of 1796 with detailed illustra- tion; showing graphically the successive positions and numbers of the several forces during the critical days of the campaign. The special object now in view does not require this elaboration. It is sufficient simply to show, by the lines on the plan, the distance to which each French army advanced, and to indicate the relative distri- bution of the various forces, on both sides, at the instant when the French northern army was driven to retreat. After this retrograde movement, the southern army still continued to advance, as shown, until Moreau learned of the retreat of his colleague and the snare into which his own process since then had been leading himself. It was evident that Jourdan could not stop short of the Rhine ; and«that his army, demoralized by defeat and retreat, would for a measurable time exercise no restraint upon a south- ward movement of the Archduke to intercept Moreau. The latter therefore also began to retreat hurriedly ; but, before he could regain the Rhine, the pressure of the Aus- trians towards the upper waters of the river became so ominous that the French were compelled to diverge to the southward, and escaped interception only by crossing at Breisach instead of by Strasbuig whence they had set out.
At present I am proposing to bring before you historical illustrations of the importance and value (1) of concentra- tion; and, as means thereto, (2) of a central line, or posi- tion, such as the Danube valley, (8) of the interior lines of movement, which such a position presents, and (4) of the bearing of communications upon military tenure and suc- cess ; of which the necessity of retreat laid upon Moreau is an instance. The most elaborate additional example to this
26 NAVAL STRATEGY
end which I shall present is drawn from wars over a hundred years antecedent to the campaign of 1796 ; but it has an advantage oyer that veiy celebrated achievement of the Archduke, in that it not only brings military and naval movement into contrast, and so into mutual illustration, but shows them actually working together. The situation in ito distinguishing features is partly militaiy, partly navaL It may be styled quite properly a combined military and naval situation, dependent upon both military and naval conditions ; so that the campaigns of the war may be called combined operations, although the combination is not so clearly on the surface that it can be seen without careful analysis. This will be succeeded by a brief account of the purely naval war that followed between the Dutch and English, 1652-1654, with which the narrative will close, and which itself is illustrative of the same lessons of con- centration, of central positions, and of interior lines.
The series thus constituted therefore is, first, the purely land campaign of 1796 in (Germany, already touched upon ; second, the mixed, or combined naval and military situations consequent upon the war of France and her allies against allied Austria and Spain, 1685-1648, in which the central position is indicated by the line of communication from Spain to Genoa by the Mediterranean, and thence by Milan to the Rhine valley ; ^ third, the purely naval hostilities be- tween the Dutch and English, 1652-1654, which occurred not long after the war between France and Austria, and was in some measure an outgrowth of that war.'
For the latter two instances, I am indebted for much in- formation, and in some measure for suggestion, to Corbett's ** England in the Mediterranean ; " amplified necessarily by reference to other authors. Gorbett in that book has added a very valuable chapter to naval history, and through naval
1 See map feeing page 01.
* See mapi facing pages 70, 72.
y
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 27
history to general history, by presenting in a connected whole a narratiye of the incidents which led Great Britain to the Mediterranean, establishing her as a Mediterra- nean Power by securely basing her navy in that sea; and, further, by showing the consequent military effect upon the general course of events — the effect on land — which was produced by the presence there of the British navy in superior force.
The entire period covered by ^ England in the Mediter- ranean" is from about 1600 to 1718; roughly, from the death of Elizabeth of England to that of Queen Anne, or to the Peace of Utrecht. First and last, we shall touch upon several occurrences in this stretch of time ; but the chief part of our treatment concerns the thirty years 1630- 1660. By the year 1640 of this period, England was re- duced to impotence for external action by Civil War beginning between the King and the Parliament; the power of France had been consolidated by Richelieu ; and a struggle, which lasted much over a century, had begun between France and the House of Austria, which then ruled not only in the German territory we now associate with its name, but over Spain as welL
This struggle between the House of Bourbon and the House of Austria was a part of the general conflict known to history as the TWrty Years' War, 1618-1648, which m its scope covered all the continent of Europe west of Rus- sia. This war, while essentially religious in origin and characteristics, nevertheless took in the end the particular form of a political contest between the two dynasties named. Although both were strongly Roman Catholic, their antag- onism was determined fundamentally by the fact that Ger- man Austria was consolidating the action of the greater part of the German states under the German Emperor, who was of the Austrian family; and that this great concentration of power was sustained by the money and
28 NAYAL STRATEGY
by the still formidable military strengfth and military po- sitions of Spain, which was also under Austrian kings. The preceding century had seen this same combination in the hands of a single sovereign, the renowned Emperor Charles V. To prevent the recurrence of such a condition became the policy of France, formulated by Henry IV. and accepted by Richelieu. For this object they associated themselves to the Protestant Powers of northern Europe : Holland, Sweden, and the numerous independent, though relatively small, German Protestant states, which also were geographically northern. These alliances have particular historical interest, because they mark the transition from the religious motive, which had dominated the previous century, — the century of the Reformation, — to the purely political combinations familiar to the following two hundred years. This is also worthy to be noted, because the ex- ternal policy of Oliver Cromwell, on which we must touch, 1650-1658, when he had consolidated the power of Great Britain for action abroad, was not only colored by the re- ligious motive but deeply influenced by it.
The position of France, as regards the two great Austrian States, was central ; and her power was greater than that of either individually. Her need, therefore, was to keep them so separated that the power of one could not reinforce that of the other. This will be recognized by military stu- dents as a frequent military situation, and one of absorbing interest when it occurs. In all such instances the under- lying principle is constant ; but the application varies with circumstances, so that illustration is enforced by novelty and diversity. The situation of France in the case now be- fore us presents a repetition in principle, though differing in circumstances, of that of the Archduke Charles between Jourdan and Moreau in 1796, just spoken of ; and this mili- tary situation also has its defile of the Danube, in the chain of positions, G^noa, Milan, and the Valtelline passes
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 29
of the Alps. Tributary to these, but similarly vital, are the sea communioations from Spain ; to Grenoa on the one hand and to the Netherlands on the other.
France being the enemy, you do not need even to look at a map to know that the resources of Spain, in troops and wealth, could reach the German Austria only by sea. The whole bulk of France, from the Pyrenees to the Rhine, interposed; but beyond her eastern frontier, which the Rhine indicates roughly, — not precisely, — the Spanish Austria held Belgium, then called the Spanish Nether- lands, on the Nordi Sea, and the Duchy of Milan in North- em Italy. To the latter of these she had access through Genoa, then in alliance with Spain. Speaking of these conditions, the great German historian Ranke, in one of his most considerable works, says: ^^The connection of Spain with the Netherlands on the one hand, and with South Italy and Milan on the other, was that which espe- cially ruled the course of international policy between the years 1500 and 1700." This was the result of the day when the Austrian Charles V. was at the same time Ger- man Emperor and King of Spain. To the inheritance of Spain and Italy from his mother, he had brought that of Holland and Belgium from his father. At the period of which we are now treating, 1630-1650, Holland had effected an actual though not yet recognized independence, but Belgium remained Spanish.
It followed that, if the ways of the sea were open, Spain having reached the Netherlands on the one side, or Genoa on the other, could then proceed, and on occasions did pro- ceed, by land to any intermediate point on German terri- tory. To twentieth century ears there is an oddness in hearing of Spanish troops acting on the Middle Rhine, and learning that they came from Belgium. The Navy of England was paraljrzed at this time by the home troubles. Until these reached their climax, the policy of Charles I.,
80 NAVAL STRATEGY
though vacillating, was upon the whole favorable to Spain ; but the Dutch Navy was hostile to her and formidable. It hindered access by the ocean and the English Channel to the Netherlands and thence to Germany. The Spanish Navy could not face the Dutch. An attempt made in 1689 to send ten thousand troops by this route led to a crushing defeat of the convoying fleet, which the Dutch attacked in the Downs, where it had sought English shelter.
In the Mediterranean the case was different. France maintained there no force equivalent to the Dutch Navy in the North Sea ; consequently Spain had open passage to Genoa, and thence by Milan and the Tyrol to the interior of Germany. Her particular route varied according to the circumstances of the times, or the fortunes of war; but in general terms it was Genoa, Milan, and thence by the passes of the Alps to the valley of the Rhine ; or to the valley of the Danube. The Rhine was the shorter and more desirable route, but when the power of France trenched upon it, the longer, exterior, route to the eastward, through the heart of Germany, could be used.
Thus, the conditions of the Danube, intermediate be- tween the territory north and south of the river, are reproduced in these Italian Possessions and the adjacent Mediterranean Cioasts, intervening between Belgium and Germany on the one side and Spain on the other. Spain, troops and treasure, could go to Genoa only by the Medi- terranean. It became therefore necessary for her to con- trol this strip of sea, and necessary for France to dispossess her, either of it, or of the Italian provinces, or of both ; for they, like the bridges of the Danube, gave means of passing the Austrian power from one side to the other, and thereby of rapidly effecting local superiority by concentrsr tion, which is the fundamental object in all military com- binations. The same positions, if in the possession of France, would enable her to concentrate a force of opposition
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 81
Buffioient to prevent the concentration of the enemy. For these reasons, as early as the reign of James I. of England, before the power of the kingdom had been shaken by civil dissension, and while the Stuart policy was hesitating be- tween ** for Spain" and ^* against Spain,'' it was proposed by Sir Walter Raleigh, in 1617, to fit out an expedition against Genoa. This project was mooted again in 1624, but on neither occasion came to anything. Successfully effected, it would have blocked the Spanish communications during the period of occupancy. The Valtelline passes of the Alps presented a similar critical link.
The situation of France relatively to her two opponents of this period — Spain and Austria — illustrates three ele- ments of strategy, of frequent mention, which it is well here to name and to define, as well as to illustrate by the instance before you.
1. There is central position, illustrated by France ; her national power and control interposing by land between her enemies. Yet not by land only, provided the coast supports an adequate navy ; for, if that be the case, the French fleet also interposes between Spanish and Italian ports. The Danube is similarly an instance of central position.
2. Interior lines. The characteristic of interior lines is that of the central position prolonged in one or more direc- tions, thus favoring sustained interposition between separate bodies of an enemy ; with the consequent power to concen- trate against either, while holding the other in check with a force possibly distinctly inferior. An interior line may be conceived as the extension of a central position, or as a series of central positions connected with one another, as a geometrical line is a continuous series of geometrical points. The expression *^ Interior Lines " conveys the meaning that from a central position one can assemble more rapidly on either of two opposite fronts than the enemy can, and there-
82 NAVAL STRATEGY
iore can utilize force more effectively. Particular examples of maritime interior lines are found in the route by Suez as compared with that by the Cape of Good Hope, and in Panama contrasted with Magellan. The Kiel Canal simi- larly affords an interior line between the Baltic and North Sea, as against the natural channels passing round Den- mark, or between the Danish Islands, — the Sound and the two Belts.^ These instances of *^ Interior '' will recall one of your boyhood's geometrical theorems, demonstrating that, from a point interior to a triangle, lines drawn to two angles are shorter than the corresponding sides of the triangle itself. Briefly, interior lines are lines shorter in time than those the enemy can use. France, for instance, in the case before us, could march twenty thousand men to the Rhine, or to the Pyrenees, or could send necessary supplies to either, sooner than Spain could send the same number to the Rhine, or Austria to the Pyrenees, granting even that the sea were open to their ships.
8. The position of France relatively to Oermany and Spain illustrates also the question of communications. *^ Communications " is a general term, designating the lines of movement by which a military body, army or fleet, is kept in living connection with the national power. This being the leading characteristic of communications, they may be considered essentially lines of defensive action ; while interior lines are rather offensive in character, enabling the belligerent favored by them to attack in force one part of
1 An interesting inetanoe of the method and forethought which cause German naral derelopment of all kinds to progress abreast, on parallel lines, is fonnd in the fkot that by the time the three Dreadnoughts laid down in 1911 are completed, and with them two complete Dreadnought squadrons of eight each, which probably will be in 1914, the Kiel Canal will have been enlarged to permit their passage. There will then be a fleet of thirty-eight battle ships ; including these sixteen, which will be stationed, eight in the North Sea, eight in the Baltic, linked for mutual support by the central canal. The programme contemplates a continuous pre-arranged replacing of the present pre-Dreadnonghts by Dreadnoughts.
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 88
the hostile line sooner than the enemy oan reinforce it, becaase the assailant is nearer than the friend As a con- crete instance, the disastrous attempt already mentioned, of Spain in 1689 to send reinforcements by the. Channel, followed Uie route from Corunna to the Straits of Dover. It did so because at that particular moment the successes of France had given her control of part of the valley of the Rhine, closing it to the Spaniards from Milan ; while the more eastern route through Grermany was barred by the Swedes, who in the Thirty Tears' War were allies of France. The Channel therefore at that moment remained the only road open from Spain to the Netherlands, between which it became the ^line of communications. Granting the attempt had been successful, the line followed is exterior; for, assuming equal rapidity of movement, ten thousand men starting from central France should reach the field sooner.
The central position of France, therefore, gave both defensive and offensive advantage. In consequence of the position she had interior lines, shorter lines, by which to attack, and also her communications to either front lay behind the front, were covered by the army at the front ; in other words, had good defense, besides being shorter than those by which the enemy on one front could send help to the other front. Further, by virtue of her position, the French ports on the Atlantic and Channel flanked the Spanish sea communications.
At the present moment, Germany and Austria-Hungary, as members of the Triple Alliance, have the same advan- tage of central and concentrated position against the Triple Entente^ Russia, France, and Great Britain.
Transfer now your attention back to the Danube when the scene of war is in that region ; as it was In 1796, and also frequently was during the period of wliich we are now speaking. A most important battle, for instance, Spaniards
84 NAVAL STRATEGY
and South Gennans against the Swedes and North Oer- mans, was fought at Noidlingen, in 1634. Up to that time the mass of the French navy had been kept in the Atlantic ports. Under this condition, Spain had open sea commu- nication with Genoa and Milan, and it was through the junction of Spanish troops coming from Milan, with Ger- man troops already in the field, that a decisive victory was gained; after which the Spaniards moved on to the Netherlands. Tou have seen before, that, if there be war between Austria and France, as there so often was, the one who held the Danube had a central position in the region. Holding means possession by military power, which power can be used to the full against the North or against the South — offensive power — far more easily than the South and North can combine against him ; because he is nearer to each than either is to the other.^ Should North wish to send a big reinforcement to South, it cannot march across the part of the Danube held, but must march around it above or below ; exactly as, in 1640, reinforcements from Spain to the Rhine had, so to say, to march around France. In such a march, on land, the reinforcement making it is necessarily in a long column, because roads do not allow a great many men to walk abreast The road followed, desig- nates in fact the alignment of the reinforcement from day to day ; and because its advance continually turns the side to the enemy, around whom it is moving, the enemy's position is said to flank the movement, constituting a recognized danger. It makes no difference whether the line of march is straight or curved ; it is extension upon it that constitutes the danger, because the line itself, being thin, is everywhere weak, liable to an attack in force upon a relatively small part of its whole. Communications are exposed, and the enemy has the interior line. Of tactical movements resembling that of the detach-
1 See map fadng page 84.
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 86
ment in the figure, Austerlitz, on the part of the allied Rus- sians and Austrians opposed to Napoleon, presented an instance ; as did also that of the Confederate detachment under Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville. The former, performed under the eyes of Napoleon, resulted in a crush- ing defeat by his concentrated attack upon the communi- cation between the two wings of the enemy, when the movement had developed so far as to be irretrievable. Jackson's movement, though in itself similarly hazardous to that of the Allies at Austerlitz, was successful because the Union commander-in-chief failed to penetrate the ene- my's designs, and consequently did not realize that the army before him was divided into two fractions which could be separated by his concentrated force. He perceived only the danger to his own right flank and rear.
The situation is this : As the detachment, laige or small, let us say from North, moves away, the space between it it and the main body becomes at once a line of communi- cation. The farther it moves, day by day, the longer that line. Granting it has supplies enough, it none the less is drawing away from facility of reinforcement, — is in this exposing its communications, is depending on itself alone ; a condition which continues until it comes in reach of support from South. During the movement, the whole national army to which it belongs — North plus South — is for the time distributed in three fractions ; one of which at least — the detachment — is not resting on a fortified position, as the two principal bodies may be, and as the enemy certainly is, because the river itself is a defense and also has been fortified at the bridges.
None of these disabilities lie upon the central position* A march from one part to the other entails no exposure. It is not meant that the enemy may not attack, but that there is not additional exposure because of the march. An occu- pied line, assumed as a position, does not have to be weak ;
36 NAYAL STRATEGY
because being stationary, the exigencies of a maich, which must follow roads, do not exist, and the troops can be dis- tributed with sole view to mutual support. That is the defensive strength of the central position ; the communica- tion between the parts is secure ; no gaps, nor weak links. For offensive strength, there are the interior lines. Center is always nearer to North and South than either is to the other ; can throw his full force in offense upon one or the other before they can combine in defense ; and also, in case of a move such as we have been considering, intended to improve the general situation by a redistribution of forces, center has the opportunity to strike one of the three divi- sions of his enemy before the others can help.
This is an illustration of the force of Napoleon's saying, that **War is a business of positions.*' All this discussion turns on position ; the ordinary, semi-permanent, positions of Center, North, and South; or the succession of positions occupied by the detachment on that line of communications along which it moves. This illustrates the importance of positions in a single instance, but is by no means exhaustive of that importance. Fully to comprehend, it is necessary to study military and naval history; bearing steadily in mind Napoleon's saying, and the definitions of central po- sition, interior lines, and communications.
Take, for example, an instance so recent as to have been contemporary with men not yet old, — ^the Turkish position at Plevna in 1877. This stopped the Russian advance on Constantinople for almost five months. Why ? Because, if they had gone on, Plevna would have been close to their line of communications, and in a central position relatively to their forces at the front and those in the rear, or behind the Danube. It was also so near, that, if the enemy ad- vanced &r, the garrison of Plevna could reach the only bridge across the Danube, at Sistova, and might destroy it, before help could come ; that is, Plevna possessed an interior
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 87
line towards a point of the utmost importance. Under these circumstances, Pleyna alone arrested the whole Rus- sian movement In the recent war between Japan and Russia,^ the Port Arthur fleet similarly threatened the Jap- anese line of communications from Japan to Manchuria, and so affected the whole conduct of the war. It was cen- tral, as regards Japan and Liao-Yang, or Mukden. Study of such conditions reinforces knowledge, by affording nu- merous illustrations of the effect of position under very differing circumstances.
Let us now go back from the Archduke Charles, and the Danube with its Centre, North, and South, to the commu- nications between the Spanish coast and the Austrian army in Germany. Should the House of Austria in Spain desire to send large reinforcements to the Danube, or to the Rhine, by way of Italy, it can do so, provided it controls the sea ; and provided also that France has not shaken its hold upon North Italy. Such a condition constitutes open and safe communications. If, however, command of the sea is not assured, if the French navy, say at Toulon, is equal to the Spanish navy in the neighborhood, there is danger of a reverse ; while if the French navy is superior locally, there is great danger not merely of a reverse but of a serious disaster. In such a case the French navy, or the port of Toulon, flanks the Spanish line of communication ; again an instance of position. As to position, Toulon would correspond to Plevna and Port Arthur. This in- stance illustrates, however, as Port Arthur conspicuously did, that the value of a position is not in the bare position, but in the use you make of it. This, it is pertinent to note, is just the value of anything a man possesses, his brains or his fortune — the use he makes of either. Should the French navy be decisively inferior locally to the Span- ish, Toulon loses its importance. As position it is still
1 See map fodng page 426.
88 NAVAL STRATEGY
good, but it cannot be used. It is an unavailable asset So at Plevna, had the garrison been so small that it could not take the field, the place either would have been captured, or could have been watched by a detachment, while the main Russian body moved on. At Port Arthur, the ineffi- ciency of the Russian navy permitted this course to the Japanese. They watched the place by navy and army, and went on with their march in Manchuria. Even so, the threat inherent in the position compelled an immense de- tachment of troops necessary for the siege, and so greatly weakened the main army in its action.
Note that it is the nearness of Toulon, as of Plevna, which constitutes the menace to the line of communication ; the line from the port to that of the communications is thus an interior line, short, enabling an attack by surprise, or in force. It is the same consideration that has made Cadiz at one time, Gibraltar now, Malta, Jamaica, Guantanamo Bay, all threatening positions ; the ones to vessels bound up or down the Mediterranean to or from Suez, the others to vessels going to or from the Isthmus of Panama. If it had been feasible for Spain to carry her reinforcements south of Sardinia and thence north, Toulon would so far have lost much of this value. As the line drew near Genoa, it would have regained control only in some measure ; that is, to a less degree and for a shorter time. As a matter of fact such roundabout lines, fau9%e% route$ as Napoleon called them, have played a notable part in the strategy of a weaker party. The most convenient commercial route is not necessarily the most significant to strategy. Napoleon, for example, when bound to Egypt from Malta in 1798, did not go direct, but first sighted Crete and then bore away for Egypt. Owing to this. Nelson in pursuit missed the French because he naturally went direct.
The same beneficial effect — the same amount of pro- tection as a roundabout line would give — might have
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 89
been obtained if the Spanish navy on the Atlantic coast threatened French ports and commerce, and thus induced France to keep her navy, in whole or in part, in that quarter, weakening her Toulon force; so that, though favorably situated, it was not strong enough to attack. This was actually the case up to 1634, in which year the defeat of the allies of France at Nordlingen, due to Spanish troops from Italy reinforcing the Imperial armies in Germany, compelled France to declare open war against Spain and to transfer her fleet to the Mediterranean. This effect was produced also in 1898 on the United States; not by the Spanish navy, which was innoxious in every- thing but talk, but by the fears of the American people, which prompted the American Government to keep the so called Flying Squadron in Hampton Roads, instead of close to the probable scene of war. Owing to this distribution, if Cervera's squadron had been efficient, it could have got into Gienfuegos instead of Santiago ; a very much harder nut to crack, because in close railroad communication with Havana and with the great mass of the Spanish army in Cuba. It is the same sort of unintelligent fear which prompts the demand now to send half the battle-fleet to the Pacific. No course could be more entirely satisfactory to an enemy, or more paralyzing to the United States fleet, than just this. All or none ; the battle-fleet concentrated, whether in the Pacific or the Atlantic.
You will remember that in the war with Spain the United States navy had reproduced for it the situation I have depicted, of a detachment trying to pass round the Danube from North to South. The ^ Oregon " was the de- tachment, and she had to join the American fleet in the West Indies, in spite of the Spanish squadron. She reached Barbados May 18 ; the day before Cervera entered Santiago, and six days after he left Martinique, which is only one hundred miles from Barbados. The utter ineffi-
40 NAVAL STRATEGY
ciency of the Spanish navy has caused us to lose sight of the risk to the ** Oregon,'' which was keenly felt by her com- mander, and concerning which at the moment two former secretaries of the navy expressed to me their anxiety. Despite this experience, there are those now who would re- constitute it for us, half the fleet in the Pacific and half in the Atlantic ; exactly the situation of Jourdan and Moreau. Should then war arise with a European state, or with Japan, it would be open to either enemy to take the Danube posi- tion between our two divisions, as Togo did between the Port Arthur and Baltic squadrons.
As a matter of experience, in the struggle to which France, Spain, and the German Empire were parties, be- tween 1680 and 1660, the importance of the line of commu- nication from Spain to Genoa became so evident that it changed the general distribution of the French navy, and also led to its enlargement. Richelieu, who died in 1642, had reorganized and consolidated the fleet ; he is looked on by many Frenchmen as the real father of their navy. His first distribution, however, had reference to Atlantic condi- tions. The ocean and the Mediterranean constitute for France the dilemma which the Atlantic and the Pacific pre- sent to the United States. Richelieu at the first stationed three squadrons on the ocean, that is, in the Channel and Bay of Biscay ; in the Gulf of Lyons only one, and that of galleys, not of sailing vessels. His original motive in reor- ganizing the navy had been the usual one of the protection of commerce and of the coasts. To that, as the aggrandize- ment of the House of Austria drew France more and more into opposition to both its branches, in Spain and in Crermany, was added the necessity of blocking the commu- nications between them by sea, notably in the English Channel and in the Mediterranean.
France entered the Thirty Years* War openly in May, 1686. For some time before she had been indirectly oppos-
HISTORlbAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 41
ing Austria, by subsidieB, and by partial action favoring her enemies ; but the immediate occasion of her taking an active part was the heavy defeat at Nordlingen, August 27, 1684, inflicted upon the allies of France, the Swedes and North Gennans. This done, the Spaniards had marched on, by the Rhine, to Belgium — their Netherlands. It may be added that this heavy reinforcement to the Spanish military power in the Netherlands probably had much to do with the Spanish successes in the following years, which at one moment (1686) threatened Paris itself.
To Richelieu's far-sighted political views, the project of obtaining the Rhine as the eastern boundary of France was already present ; but at this time his particular military aim was to sever the communications from Italy through the south of Germany, where the Austrian power lay, to the Netherlands, upon which he intended the weight of his attack on Spain to fall, and which he proposed to divide between France and Holland. In order to ef- fect this interruption of communications, he had already, in 1688, taken possession of Lorraine, then an independent (German state near, but west of, the Rhine, because it had helped the Emperor. From there the French forces had also entered Alsace, which borders the river. Thus France interrupted the communication by the Rhine valley ; but subsequent events, culminating in the battle of Nordlingen, had opened to the Spaniards another line of communication, exterior to that by the valley of the Rhine ; longer, but serviceable.
This was too far interior to Germany for France to reach just then; consequently it became necessary to attack that part of the long line of communication which was by sea, viz. : from the east coast of Spain to Genoa. Accord- ingly, Richelieu in 1686 ordered his Atlantic squadrons round to Toulon. As is often the case, his reasons for this move may have been more than one. Grardiner, the most
42 NAVAL STRATEGY
recent and exhaustive historian for this period, surmises that the motive was to withdraw the French navy from contact with the English ; for the English king, Charles I., though formally neutral, was helping Spain in the Channel. English ships of war convoyed Spanish transports, with men, supplies, and money, to Dunkirk; which, though at the present time French, was then the militeiry port of the Spanish Netherlands. Richelieu did not wish a rup- ture with England, and the surest way to avoid it was to keep his ships out of the way. This was the more impera- tive, because the English king viewed with jealousy the efforts of France to create a navy then, exactly as the Brit- ish people toKlay are viewing with fear and distrust the growth of the Grerman navy. The navy of Spain was then a long existent fact, to which, and to beating it, England was accustomed ; the French navy was new, and an addi- tional danger. Moreover, Spain was far away; whereas France, like Germany now, bordered the Narrow Seas.
Whatever the reason, the fact is certain that in 1636 the French navy left the Atlantic, and concentrated at Toulon, then a partly developed arsenal, for galleys only. Mean- time the Spaniards, to secure the sea communications, had seized the Lerins Islands between Toulon and Genoa, and were fortifying them. This position gave them a base whence to interrupt French coast trade — offensive ; and also to support their own communications to Genoa — de- fensive. It is to this act of the Spaniards, specifically, that Corbett attributes the concentration of the French navy at Toulon ; in which case the movement was not an instance of military foresight and sagacity, but the simple recognition of a present condition too obvious to be overlooked. The Spaniards soon after, most inopportunely for themselves, reduced their garrison in the Lerins, which the French were thus enabled to regain in 1687. The advantage of position was thus restored to Toulon.
CHAPTER ni
mSTOEICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS
(^Cantinued)
THE general war against the House of Austria, as conducted by Richelieu, appears to have suffered from tiie same cause that saps the vigor of many wars; he attempted too many things at once, instead of concentrating for decided supe- riority in some one or two localities. For such concen- tration he had good opportunities, owing to the central positition and interior lines possessed by France. It was open to him to act in great force either in Belgium, or on the Rhine, or in Italy, or towards Spain. Moreover, he had the initial advantage of a natural concentration : one nation against two, and those separated in space. The proverbial weakness of alliances is due to inferior power of concentration. Granting the same aggregate of force, it is never as great in two hands as in one, because it is not perfectly concentrated. Each party to an alliance usually has its particular aim, which divides action. In any mili- tary scheme that comes before you, let your first question to yourself be. Is this consistent with the requirement of concentration? Never attempt to straddle, to do two things at the same time, unless your force is evidently so supreme that you have clearly more than enough for each.
Our profession has never produced a man more daring in enterprise, nor more skilful in manag^ement, than Nelson. Remember, therefore, and always, that, when he sent off two frigates on some expedition, he charged their captains :
^ If you meet two enemies, do not each attack one. Com-
44 HAVAL STRATEGY
bine botb on one of the enemy; you will make sure of that one, and you may also get the other afterwards ; but, whether the second escape or not, your country will have won a victory, and gained a ship/'
The same consideration applies to ship design. Tou can- not have everything. If you attempt it, you will lose eveiy- thing; by which I mean that in no one quality will your vessel be as efficient as if you had concentrated purpose on that one* On a given tonnage, — which in ship-building corresponds to a given size of army or of fleet, — there cannot be had the highest speed, and the heaviest bat- tery, and the thickest armor, and the longest coal en- durance, which the tonnage would allow to any one of these objects by itself. If you try, you will be repeating Richelieu's mistake when he tided to carry on offensive war on four frontiers. He also wanted four things. In the Netherlands he wanted conquest; on the Rhine, to hold the Spanish communications, possibly conquest as well; in Italy, to hold the communications ; and lastly, in Spain, to sustain a rebellion in Catalonia with a view to the uniting of that province to France. The war lasted his life, al- though he lived for seven years after it began. Happily for France, by the force of circumstances her navy could remain concentrated in the Mediterranean. This was due partly to the fact that the fleet of England, which favored Spain, was fettered for offensive action by the gpx)wing disputes between the King and the Parliament; but it was owing chiefly to Holland being the ally of France. The Dutch fleet was strong enough to keep the Spanish in check in the Channel, without French assistance, despite Charles' friendly attitude to Spain; for the King was afraid to provoke hostilities by too positive action against Holland, lest he should have to summon Parliament to get money for war.
I am always much in favor of enforcing military anal-
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 46
ogies. By this I mean showing the existence and effect of a single principle, underlying and deciding, in circum- stances which superficially seem very diverse* Take, for example, the long line of frontier over which Richelieu had to act : the Netherlands ; along the Rhine ; the Italian Alps ; the Mediterranean coast, centering from Toulon to Genoa ; lastly, Spain. The proper course would not be to attempt all at once, but to assemble as rapidly and secretly as possible a great preponderance on one part, while in the other quarters the attitude should be essentially defensive, however much this fact should be concealed by a display of energy ; making a big smoke, as the proverb says. Now this rule of concentration is precisely the same in the com- paratively short line of a battle-field. That is to say, the rule ^)plies to the limited field of tactics, as well as to the broader of strategy. Granting some approach to equality between two opponents, the object of each must not be to have a square set-to all along the front, but to throw the weight upon one quarter, while on the other action is either a feint or a ref usaL Refusing, in military parlance, means keeping back part of your force actually, however vigorous and earnest its demonstration may appear.
In land warfare, the part of the enemy to attack will be determined usually by conditions of the ground ; because, from these conditions, in addition to a local superiority of numbers, which you effect by concentration, you seek some disadvantage of position somewhere to the enemy, and consequently some increased advantage to yourself. For instance, one flank of the enemy may rest on a river ; im- passable, or with insufficient bridges. If you attack on the other flank, you may throw him round with his back to the river; when, if defeated, he is evidently in danger of destruction. Or, one flank being driven back, you may force his whole line round at right angles, and drive him off the road behind, by which his supplies come — severing
46 NAVAL STRATEGY
his communications. This was what Wellington expected Napoleon would attempt in the Waterloo campaign, in oitler to cut the British off from the sea. Or, again, there may be something in the conditions which encourages an assault upon his center ; because, if you break through, you will then, with the advantage of the particular position gained, be able to keep one half in check, while you throw your mass of men on the other half.^ Napoleon in Italy, for in- stance, thus used a central position successfully against numbers much superior to his own, which had made the mistake, similar to that of Jourdan and Moreau, of advanc- ing on exterior lines, on either side of Lake Gktrda, which with its outlet, the Mincio, thus became their Danube val- ley. Their commander was moved to this division by the superficially plausible idea that while he himself attacked on the east, in front, with superior numbers, driving the French back, the western body would act in the rear, cut- ting the French communications with Milan and Genoa. Bonaparte at the moment was occupjdng Verona and be- sieg^g Mantua. Abandoning both these positions, he fell back upon the Mincio, and to its west bank. This he held against the eastern Austrians with a small force strength- ened by the river, and with the delay thus obtained was enabled to fall upon the western at Lonato in much superior numbers. Those of you who will take the trouble to read Jomini's "Wars of the French Revolution,'' espec- ially Bonaparte in Italy in 1796, will find instruction in the use of ground. This campaign required special care in utilizing position, because Napoleon was usually in inferior numbers.
Generally, in land warfare, the attack on the flank of an enemy's line is preferred, unless there be strong opposing reasons in the nature of the ground. I apprehend that the reason is substantially this : that each flank is farther from
1 See map flKdog page 40.
FRENCH AUSTRIAN
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 47
the other than either is from the center. Consequently each flank, and both flanks, can help the center more easily than either flank can help the other. It is, in short, a question of distance, or, more accurately, of time. For instance, reverting to Richelieu's line, it will be seen that if he attacked in force the Netherhnds on one flank, it would take Spanish reinforcements from Italy much longer to get there than if he attacked the center, on the Rhine. In naval tactics, as in land battle-fields, this same consider- ation usually determines the character of attack. There are exceptions. At the battle of Cape St. Vincent the British admiral attacked the enemy's center ; but that was because the enemy had left the center so weak — in fact, stripped — that it was possible for the British fleet to inter- pose between the two flanks, and engage one only of them, as Napoleon broke the enemy's center at AusterUtz.
The fighting order of navies still continues a line ; which is called more properly a column, because the ships are ranged one behind the other. Nevertheless, if the arrange- ment of the guns, from van to rear, is regarded, it will be seen that they really are deployed on a line fronting the enemy. As a rule, in instructed naval warfare, attack has been on one flank of that line. It is commonly spoken of as an attack on van or rear, because of the columnar forma- tion of the ships, but it is reaUy a flank attack; and, whichever flank is chosen, the attack on the other is essentially refused, because the numbers devoted to it are not sufficient to press an attack home. The cul- mination of the sail era — Trafalgar — was fought ex- actly on these lines. Nelson concentrated the bulk of his fleet, a superior force, on the left flank of the enemy, which happened to be the rear; against the right flank he sent a smaller number. He did not indeed give specific orders to the smaller body not to attack, or to refuse themselves. That was not his way. Moreover,
48 NAVAL STRATEGY
he intended himself to take charge of this attack in smaller force, and to be governed by circumstances as to the development of it ; but the result was shown in the fact that the larger part of the enemy's right flank escaped, and all probably wou]4 if they had maneuvered welL The hostile loss fell on the other flank and on the center; and not only was this the case in result, but also Nelson in form and in his ordere purposed just this* He put the concen- trated attack in the hands of his second ; ^^ I/* said he, in effect, ^ will see that the other flank of the enemy does not interfere." Conditions modified his action ; but that was his plan, and although, from the particular conditions, he actually pierced the enemy's center, still, having done so, the subsequent attack fell upon the flank originally in- tended, while the other flank was kept in check by the rear ships of Nelson's own division. These, as they advanced in column, lay athwart the line by which the enemy's van, if it tacked, would approach the rear, or other flank ; and they thus prevented its approach by that route until too late to be effective.
Nelson, who was a thoughtful as well as a daring tac- tician, expressed reasons for attacking one flank rather than another, under differing conditions in which the fleets presented themselves; but, speaking generally, the rear was the better to attack, because the van could not, and cannot, come as soon to help the rear as the rear can the van. It has to turn round, to begin with; and, before turning round, its commander has to make up his mind, which few men do quickly, unless they have reached con- clusions beforehand. All this means time. Besides, the assailant can more easily place himself in the way of such new movement of the van, than he can of the rear coming up on the line of advance it already has. Still, there are some reasons in favor of the van. Nelson in 1801 said that in case of encountering a Russian fleet he would attack the
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 49
van ; because injury to it would throw the enemy's order into confusion, £rom which the Russians were not good enough maneuverers to recover. That is a special reason, not a geneiaL It takes account of a particular circum- stance, as a general on shore does of a particular locality. When Farragut passed the Mobile forts his van was thrown into confusion, and all know what a critical moment that was. It matters little what the incident is, if the confusion is produced.
In the Battle of the Japan Sea the attack again was on a flank, and that the van. Whether this was due to previ- ous purpose of the Japanese, or merely arose from the con- ditions as they presented themselves, I do not know ; but its tendency certainly would be to cause confusion. I do not wish, however, to argue here a question of tactics. My subject is strategy, and I am using tactics simply to illus- trate the predominance, everywhere, under all conditions and from the nature of things, of the one great principle of concentration; and that, too, in the specific method of so distributing your own force as to be superior to the enemy in one quarter, while in the other you hold him in check long enough to permit your main attack to reach its full result. That necessary time may be half an hour on a field of battle ; in a campaign it may be days, weeks, per- haps more.
In further illustration, I wish now to apply the same principle and method to the question of coast defense and attack. When a country is at war, its whole frontier, and the whole frontier of its opponent, are subject to attack. This constitutes the defensive aspect of frontiers. They also can be used throughout their whole extent as points from which attack can be made ; and this is their offensive aspect, on one side and on the other. In land warfare, as between France and Germany in 1870, or as in the wars of Richelieu of which we have been speaking, it will com-
50 NAVAL STRATEGY
monly happen that the belligerents adjoin one another, that the political frontier is not only common, but identical — the same line for each. This is not indeed invariably the case. The late war between Japan and Russia was fought mainly on Chinese soil, and Belgium has been proverbially the battle ground for quarrels in which her inhabitants had little national interest Nevertheless, the military frontier, the line between the two fronts of operations, is substan- tially common to each belligerent. In maritime warfare this cannot be the case. Here the sea constitutes for each of the two opponents the political frontier, which in so far is common, but from its width is not identical. The inter- vening sea is less a line than a position, central between the two, dividing them from one another, and in so far re- producing the characteristic noted of the Danube. It will readily be recognized that the power which really controls the sea, as Great Britain at times has done, possesses ex- actly the Danube advantage ; she can throw superior force in either direction, for defense or attack.
The war between Great Britain and the United States in 1812 presented an example of both kinds of frontier. There was the land frontier, between Canada and the United States ; and there was the American ocean frontier, against which Great Britain operated as she chose, because she commanded the sea, the central position, intervening between America and the British Islands. In my ^^ War of 1812'* I have discussed the general situation as embraced in the two frontiers, and also the special conditions of each, as indicative of where the offensive should have been as- sumed by the United States, and where the defensive ; it being evident that all parts were not equally favorable to offensive action, nor did the country possess forces ade- quate so to act everywhere. I mention these discussions because, whether my own estimates were accurate or not, they serve to illustrate the fact that in any frontier line, or
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 61
any strategic front of operations, or any line of battle, of- fensive effort may, and therefore should, be concentrated in one part, not distributed along the whole. This possibility, and a convenient way of conceiving it, Jomini expresses in an aphorism which may be commended to memory, be- cause it sums up one important consideration concerning any military disposition whatever ; whether it be the stra- tegic front of operations in a campaign, or a tactical order of battle, or a frontier. Every such situation, Jomini says, may be properly regarded as a line ; and every line divides, logically and actually, into three parts, — ^the center, and the two extremes, or flanks.
Guard yourselves, of course, from imagining three equal parts. We are not dealing here with mathematics, but with military conceptions. For practical results, let us apply at once to the United States of to-day. The United States has a long ocean frontier, broken at Mexico by the inter- position of land, as the French maritime frontier is broken at the Pyrenees; yet the coast lines, like the French, possess a certain maritime continuity, in that ships can pass from end to end by sea. In such cases, it may be said without exaggeration that an ocean frontier is con- tinuous. At present, the United States has one frontier which is strictly continuous, by land as by water, from the coast of Maine to the Rio Grande. There are in it, by natural division, three principal parts: the Atlantic, the Gulf, and the Straits of Florida. I do not deny that for purposes of study further convenient subdivisions may be made; but it may fairly be claimed that these three are clear, are primary, and are principal They are very un- equal in length, and, from the military standpoint, in importance; for while the peninsula of Florida does not rank very high in the industrial interests of the nation, a superior hostile fleet securely based in the Stiaits of Florida could effectively control intercourse by water between the
62 NAVAL STRATEGY
two flanks. It would possess central position ; and in vir- tue of that central position, its superiority need not be over the whole United States navy, should that be divided on each side of the central position. The supposed enemy, in such position, would need only to be decisively superior to each of the divisions lying on either side; whereas, were they united, superiority would require to be over the whole. It was this condition which made Cuba for the first century of our national existence a consideration of the first importance in our international relations. It flanked national communications, commercial and militaiy. We know that there exists in our country an element of wis- dom which would treat such a situation, which geography has constituted for us, as two boys do an apple. This would divide the fleet between the two coasts, and call it fair to both ; because, so it is reasoned, — or rat;her argued, — defending both. It certainly, however, would not be concentration, nor effective.
Before passing on, note the striking resemblance between the Florida peninsula and that of Korea. Togo, at Ma- sampo, was to Rozhestvensky and the Russians at Vladi- vostok just as a hostile fleet in the Straits of Florida would be to American divisions in the Gulf and at Hampton Roads. In like manner at an earlier period Togo and Kamimura, working apart but on interior lines, separated the three fine fighting ships in Vladivostok from the Port Arthur division.
The United States, however, has an even more urgent situation as to frontier in its Atlantic and Pacific coasts. If my claim is correct, in the instance of France, that a water frontier is continuous when passage from end to end by water is practicable, this is also continuous; and the battle-fleet has demonstrated the fact within the past few years. The United States, then, has a maritime frontier line from Eastport, Maine, to Puget Sound; and, like other
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 68
militaiy lines, it divides into three principal parts inunedi- ately obvious, — the Atlantic Coast, the Pacific Coast, and the line between. This summary will not be any more true, nor any more useful for reflection, when the line passes by Panama instead of the Straits of Magellan ; but it certainly will be more obvious. It then will be seen easily, as now may be seen certainly, that the important part of the long line in the present case, as in the future, is the center, because that insures or prevents passage in force from side to side ; the transfer of force ; in short, the communications. This reproduces again the Danube posi- tion, and also the chain of Spanish positions from Genoa to Belgium. It is once more the central position, which we have met before in such varying localities and periods ; but the central position of Panama has over that now open to us, by Magellan, the advantage of interior lines, of which class of lines indeed the contrast between the exist- ing and the future routes offers a notable illustration.
In order to see clearly here, we must recur to statements before made. In what consists the advantage of central position? In the position itself, however strong it be? No; but in the use made of it. The central position is contributory, not principal ; one element of a situation, but not the only one, nor even the chief. It is of little use to have a central position if the enemy on both sides is stronger than you. In short, it is power plus position that constitutes an advantage over power without position ; or, more instructively, equations of force are composed of power and position in vaiying degrees, surplus in one tending to compensate for deficiency in the other. If the mobile force, army in the field or navy, be great enough to maintain itself alone in any part of the field, or on any section of the frontier, it holds the central position in virtue of its own strength, and that no matter where it may be. If the American fleet be strong enough to force
64 NAVAL STRATEGY
its way from one coast to the other, it has the central posi- tion by virtue of its own power. When the Panama Canal is fortified, and its locks insured against treachery, the fleet will have power plus position, and fortified posi- tion at that ; till then, the fleet must depend upon its own power alone to control the center of the line, the freedom of movement from flank to flank, — from the Atlantic to the Pacific, or vice versd. So long as the fleet is strong enough for that, against any particular enemy, the center of the frontier is secure, and consequently the communi- cations. Then, from the pure military point of view, all that either flank requires is to be strong enough to resist attack until the fleet comes to its aid. That is, it requires adequate fortification, in the broad sense which includes harbor works, guns, garrison, and torpedo equipment ; and it should have also an organization of land forces which can prevent an enemy's army from establishing itself in impregnable control of some decisive position.
It follows, of course, that where position is assured, and in proportion as it is assured, less force may be needed. Still, if the United States have an enemy in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific, no advantage of position will dispense from the necessity of having a fleet stronger than either the one or the other singly. That is a One-Power standard, the minimum now needed by the United States. The National Review for July, 1909, contained an article entitled " Navy and Empire," in which occurs the follow- ing definition, in my judgment correct : ** The Two-Power standard must mean the maintenance of two fleets, the one superior in all arms to the foreign fleet next in order of strength,'' that is, the next strongest to the British, ^^ the other superior in all arms to the foreign fleet next again in order of strength." I do not here say that the United States needs a Two-Power standard, as Great Britain may ; but, if she did, that is a correct definition of such stand-
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 66
aid. Taking present conditions in Europe, and present na- val programmes, the Two-Power standard requires that Great Britain have in home waters a fleet distinctly superior to that of Germany, and that she shall be able coincidently to place in the Mediterranean one equally superior to those of Austria and Italy combined.
The interior position will enable you to get there sooner, but with that its advantage ends. It does not give also the ^ most men*' needed to complete the familiar aphorism. The position in itself gives no larger numbers ; and when left it serves only the defensive purpose of a refuge, a base of supplies, a line of communication. It cannot be carried to the field of battle, as a reinforcement. But if you have an enemy in the Atlantic, and also one in the Pacific, and are superior to each singly, though not to both com- bined, central position may give an opportunity of dealing with one or the other singly and decisively ; of preventing their junction in a force which you cannot meet. So, through the Russian mismanagement, Togo dealt in suc- cession with the divisions of Port Arthur, of Vladivostok, and of the Baltic.
It may be said there is here a great deal of ^^ if* and of **but.'* Quite so; and every time you tackle a concrete problem of war you will find " if " and " but " playing an
enormous part It is the **ifs" and the ^^buts" which constitute the dilemma of the commander-in-chief; but they also, when solved or overcome, are his title to honor. Study the '* ifis " and the ^' buts " that hung around Napo- leon before Austerlitz. They will be found in conveniently condensed form in Ropes* life of the Emperor. Remember, too, that within ten years you have yourselves witnessed just such a problem, a game played under your own eyes. Japan — Togo — had a central position, interior lines, and a force superior to either of the two enemy's divisions, that of the Baltic and that of the Far East, which lay on each
56 NAVAL STRATEGY
fiide of him. These hostile bodies were separated by a distance little inferior to that from Hampton Roads to San Francisco, by Magellan ; vastly greater than that by the Panama CanaL United, the two Russian fleets would be so &r superior that it may be questioned whether Togo could have faced them early in the war ; if he could, it would have been through superior intrinsic efficiency not through equality of numbers. Can it be supposed that there were not plenty of ^^ ifs '' and *^ buts " in the months preceding the hour when he signalled his fleet, ^ The safety of the Empire depends upon this day's results?''
We have assurance that it was so ; that from the flrst the Japanese through their inferiority of numbers were trammeled by the necessity of hosbanding their battleships, and that the deepest anxiety, even alarm, was felt as the unexpected tenacity of Port Arthur protracted the time when the fleet before the place could be withdrawn and refitted to meet the Baltic fleet. Granting the truth of the signal when made, how vastly truer, how very doubtful the conditions, if the Port Arthur division had continued in the condition of the previous summer, or if Rozhestvensky had arrived ten months earlier. But^ Rozhestvens^ ar- rived too late ; hut^ when he did, the Port Arthur division no longer existed.
Even so. Admiral Togo still had " ifs " and ** buts '' to harass him. A Japanese officer on the fleet staff wrote of the moment before Rozhestvensky's arrival:
** The time when we felt the greatest anxiety was two or three days before the battle. We had expected the Russian fleet to be sighted by our southermost vessels by May 28, or at latest 25 ; but no report came from them, nor did we receive from any sources any information about the Russian fleet Now we began to doubt whether the enemy hsA not entered the Pacific and gone round to the Strait of Soya or Tsugaru. Being in the dark as to the route the enemy had taketi, it was the most trying time for us. Even
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 67
Admiral Togo, although very strong in his conyiction that the enemy must come oy Tsushima, seemed to have felt a certain uneasiness at that time."
Consider the ^ifs'' and *^buts" that confronted the Archduke Charles in that campaign of 1796, which has been used as an illustration to initiate this treatment of strategy. The period of his operations coincided, broadly, with the brilliant successes of Bonaparte in his immortal campaign of that same year in Italy — successes which of themselves constituted a gigantic (f for Austrian calcula- tion. The Archduke's inferiority to his own two immedi- ate opponents, Jourdan and Moreau, {f they were united, introduced innumerable {ft and huU peculiar to himself. All these he met, and in the end overcame, by opposing concentration to dispersion ; by the masterly use made of the central position assumed, and the interior lines used by him, in virtue of the strong natural advantages of the Danube. This river, and its tributaries from tiie south, he utilized as Bonaparte during the same season utilized the smaller river Mincio, the outlet of Lake Gkirda, in Italy. The Archduke turning upon Jourdan, to the north, threw a decidedly superior mass on the left flank of the general French advance, which may be considered his own right His own left flank, south of the Danube, he refused. That is, opposing inferior numbers to Moreau on the south of the river, he instructed his subordinate in charge of that operation to dispute every stream, but not to allow himself to be drawn into a pitched battle ; on the contrary, to retire continually, keeping his force substan- tially unimpaired. In connection with these orders, he used an illuminating expression, which illustrates emphatically that exclusiveness of purpose which Napoleon eulogized and practiced; the singleness of mind and concentration of effort by which a great commander solves his {ft and huU^ by fastening tenaciously on the one thing needfuL
68 > NAVAL STRATEGY
Doubts may be many; truth is one. ^It matters not,*^ said the Archduke, *^ if Moieau gets to Viemia, provided I meantime crush Jourdan/'
In this fine resolve we have the reply to those who would divide the battle-fleet between the Atlantic and Pacific. Had the Archduke divided his force, half against Jourdan and half against Moreau, it would have mattered greatly had Moreau reached Vienna, for, the northern Aus- trians also being inferior and compelled to retreat con- tinually, Jourdan would have been on hand to join his colleague. As it was, when Moreau was nearest Vienna Jourdan was back at the Rhine in rapid retreat; and there was nothing left for Moreau but to retire precipi- tately, or else be cut off by an enemy superior to himself, confronting and intercepting him on his line of communi- cations. The situation, in short, was that of Rozhestvensky, and like it entailed results unfortunate though not equally disastrous.
The issue would have been the same, even had Vienna fallen. Moscow fell in 1812, and we know the result. Napoleon, master of the center of Europe, had attempted, from his central position to act simultaneously on both flanks — Russia and Spain; and even his then gigantic power was imequal to the strain, although his instructions to Marmont show that he intended to restrict his forces in the Peninsula to a defensive rCle. There may be for us ex- cellent reasons for stationing our fleet in the Pacific or in the Atlantic, but there is no good reason for dividing it be- tween the two. Choose one flank or the other upon which the fleet shall act offensively, as a fleet should act, — must act; and refuse the other flank, keep it on the defensive as far as naval action is concerned. To use the Archduke's words: ^ It makes no matter what happens there, if the fleet crush its antagonist." You will understand, of course, that it is not meant that nothing disagreeable can happen,
EXPLANATION
0 French divisions ■ Austrian divisions ustrian Centre, on Rhine ustrian Left, on Rhine ustrian Right, on Rhine 3urdan, Northern French [oreau. Southern French ^notion, Austrian Centre and Left •^^Ainction, Austrian Main Body and Right (Jourdan
begins to retreat) ustrian Left disputing Moreau*s advance imuitaneous Positions of Jourdan and Moreau,
August 10 imuitaneous Positions of Jourdan and Moreau,
September 9 '*'-%^-.-» Austrian converging Retreats and French
Advances •<• •<•• Jourdan *s Retreat :::t Austrian Pursuit of Jourdan >>> Moreau*s Advance, where not coincident
with Austrian Retreat ««« Moreau*s Retreat 4-4- Austrian March towards South to intercept
Moreau
.^
CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
JUNE- OCTOBER 1796
Showing French advance on two exterior lines; Austrian conversing retreats to central line of Danube ; Austrian concen- tration north of Danube against northern French; and consequent divergent re- treats of both Frencii armies.
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 59
no misfortune ; it would have been exceasively disagreeable to the AuBtrians to have Moreau reach Vienna. In 1898, the Flying Squadron was kept in Hampton Roads, mainly to assure our northern coast that nothing disagi-eeabla should occur. Wars in which nobody geta hurt are not within our purview. In a military sense, as affecting ul- timate national safety and victory, it will not matter if one coast suffer raid, blockade, bombardment, or capture, if meanwhile the enemy's fleet be destroyed. With such de- struction every other loss is retrievable, provided the country, which is not willing to make military preparation beforehand, proves willing to endure the burden of such exertions as may be necessary to reduce to submission an invader whose cotninunications and retreat are both cut off. An army under such conditions may exist off the counby, as, for instance, Hannibal did ; but there can be only one end to the wastage of men and of military supplies if severed from t)ie sea. It may be easy to get into a country from which it will be difficult to withdraw. The sea was tiie security of Wellington, and more recently of the Japanese, as the loss of it was the ruin of Hannibal and of the French in Egypt, in 1798-1801, almost without further effort.
What remuns of it aU, therefore, is not that central posi- tion, Ulterior lines, or concentrated force, each singly or all united, as Togo had them, confer security or certainty. The result from all is merely that they confer distinct ad- vantage ; that in an equation of force, they being added to one or the other side are not zero quantities, nor small quantities, but of great determining weight; that to over- come them, the force on the other side must be largely in- creased. If we assume the aggregate Russian navy to have been twenty-five per cent stronger than the Japaaese, it would be decisively supeiior to the latter did the totals meet Divide it in half, and each fraction is but sisty-two
60 NAVAL STRATEGY
and one-half per cent of the enemy, who holds a central position, and is able to move towards either by a line shorter than that which each has to cover to reach the other. On mere mathematical calculation, this signifies that in the collision the inferior fraction, in order that its own side may win, must so damage its superior enemy as to reduce him, not only to, but below, the sixty-two and one-half per cent. Whatever the ultimate result, — and some chance will enter, — it is at least doubtful whether the first frac- tion, so outnumbered, will inflict such damage. If it does not, and the concentrated force wins, it will have owed its success to its interior lines, its central position, and the fact that, though inferior, it was concentrated. It turns upon the second enemy with a preponderance greatly re- duced from that of the first collision — reduced perhaps to terms of bare equality ; but there is now present with it, and not with its new antagonist, the great moral factor which redoubles energy, which Napoleon has said domi- nates war, — the flush of confldence engendered by success.
CHAPTER IV
mSTORIGAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS
{OofUinued)
jA S we are about, at this point, to resume the histori- y^L cal narratiye of the war of France under Riohe* /-\ lieu against combined Anatria and Spain, I ^ -^^ will remind you of that which was remarked at the beginning of the preceding lecture, — namely : that the campaign of the Archduke Charles in the Danube valley illustrates the principles of concentration, of central posi- tion, and of interior lines from the side of land warfare only ; that the war between France and Austria, which was afterwards considered, and which requires still some further treatment, presents a case wherein both land and sea power are involved; and that there is to follow the instance of Cromwell^s naval war with the Dutch, in which illustra- tion is confined to a naval campaign. This last is the par- ticular subject of this present lecture.
Thus far the position of France and her contest with the House of Austria in its two branches, Germany and Spain, in the days of Richelieu and Mazarin, has been used as an historical instance, illustrative of certain principles of strategy. In the historical narrative we paused at a mo- ment which may be defined not inaccurately as coinciding with the death of Richelieu, — in December, 1642; stop- ping there in order to use the instruction of the war, so far, in application to those general principles. In this ap- plication free digression to other historical examples was admitted for purposes of illustration ; for it is desirable to enforce the uniformity of principles to be traced in very
62 NAVAL STRATEGY
diverse military conditions. It is, I think, a distinct gain for a man to realize that the military principle of concen- tration applies to the designing of a ship, to the composi- tion of a fleet, or to the peace distribution of a navy, as effectually as it does to the planning of a campaign or to an order of battle.
I now resume the historical narrative from the death of Richelieu; purposing, however, to put forward only so much of an account as may serve to give the background of the course of events, and to point a military moraL After Richelieu died, the control of France passed within a brief period into the hands of Mazarin, whose general ex- ternal policy was in direct continuation of that of Henry IV and Richelieu. The European conditions still were, France against the two branches of the House of Austria; but the general war, which in its beginnings resembled a confused turmoil, in which it is difficult to trace any co- herence or distinctness of character, because of the multi- tude of events and of the cross purposes of many of the combatants, has gradually assumed more definiteness of outline. In brief, it may be said that now, allied to France are Holland, Sweden, and the north German princes; while with Spain and Austria stands Bavaria, with southern Germany in general. Beginning as a re- ligious war, it has become chiefly political in objects. The effort of France has become more concentrated on the right flank of her enemies — her own left; that is, upon Germany, and especially upon Belgium, then called the Spanish Netherlands. In Italy she marks time, and much the same in Catalonia, where the rebellion of the in- habitants supports her. Meantime her internal troubles had been put down by Richelieu. The internal power of the state has been concentrated and strengthened, as well as her external effort. She has developed generals and is winning victories. Spain, on the contrary, has been
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 68
steadily decUning in efficiency, and is embarrassed by re- volt in Catalonia, as well as in Portugal, which then (1640) regained the independence of which she had been deprived by Spain in 1680. The Catalans failed to achieve the like success.
Thus France waxed stronger and stronger, Spain and the Austrian cause weaker and weaker. In 1646, the French and Swedes penetrated Bavaria, laid the country under con- tribution, and by this means detached it from the Austrian cause. Then the French in turn forsook their allies the Swedes, who were operating in Grermany, and threw the weight of their efforts upon the Netherlands, where Holland was aiding them, but no longer veiy zealously. The suc- cesses of the allies caused jealousy of each other. Con- centration of effort between them became impossible, for each still dreaded seeing the other become too powerful. This could not be but markedly so with Holland, confined chiefly to naval power, under conditions which made it im- possible to vie with France in land force or extension of territory. Holland consequently could not see with ease the approach of the French boundary towards her own, through new acquisitions in the Netherlands.
The result was that Holland, which for some time had been lukewarm in spirit and null in action, made early in 1648 a separate peace with Spain, abandoning France ; and late in the same year, in October, France and Sweden, with their allies, made the peace of Westphalia with the German Empire and Bavaria, which threw over their ally, Spain. These transactions marked the end of the Thirty Years' War. Spain refused terms, and hostilities continued be- tween her and France alone, neither state having allies. The gain of France at this moment was consequently taken from Grermany only. She obtained the country we know as Alsace, which remained hers until the Franco-German war of 1870. This advanced her border to that part of the
64 NAVAL STRATEGY
Rhine through a length of a hundred miles ; and her hold upon the river was confirmed by the cession of two f or^ tresses, Philipsburg and Breisach, on the German side of the stream, one at each extremity of the boundary of Alsace. It will be instructive to compare the position of these two with that of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajo^ in the Peninsular War,^ which defined the front of operations between the British in Portugal and the French in Spain ; suppof)ing the control of the party that possessed them over the ter- ritory in their rear, as well as constituting a basis for offensive movements forward. The capture of the two in 1812 was the essential preliminaiy to Wellington's subse- quent advance, which expelled the French from Spain.
Coincident with the Westphalia settiement, which left France and Spain at war for ten years more, a new force appeared upon the European stage. This was England under Oliver Cromwell, whose strong hand and military power imposed internal order in the state, and thus enabled him to exert on external policy the influence which the Stuart kings were never able to effect, because continually at variance with the people in Parliament. Charles I. was beheaded in January, 1649, three months after the peace of Westphalia was signed; and for nearly ten years following — that is, coincident with the continuing war between France and Spain — existed the absolute power of the English Protector. One of the first and most important steps of the new government was a reorganization of the navy, under the auspices which had made the contemporary English army a singularly efficient body. In this reconstitution of the navy there were two decisive features : 1, in place of a force in large part irregular, depending much upon merchant ships impressed as occasion demanded, was substituted a regular standing navy of vessels built especially for the state and for war ; 2, the handling of this force, in disci-
1 See map ficing page 94.
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 65
pline, in tactics, and m strategy, was committed to military men, army generals and colonels, who made of it an effec- tive military organization. The traditions of the seamen of that day did not fit them for originating such military fea- tures ; they had to be imparted by men who were soldiers before they became seamen. The result was a military navy such as in the same exclusive sense had never existed before.
With this formidable weapon, which was backed by an army of equal efficiency, seasoned by a half-dozen years of war and exultant in almost constant victory, the island state looked out upon Europe, and that with no friendly eyes. An intensely Protestant republic, she saw two Roman Catholic kingdoms at war. A maritime and commercial community, she saw across the water, in Holland, a body of rivals, — Protestant, indeed, and republic, in which might be presumed a bond of sympathy ; but there were old griev- ances unsettled and present inequalities in matters of navi- gation and commerce. For fifty years back, as the Dutch with English assistance had freed themselves progressively from the Spanish yoke, they had been undermining English shipping by the competition of cheaper ships and cheaper wages, until the carrying trade of England was largely in Dutch bottoms.
The motives which underlay Cromwell's policy remain obscure and disputed, because the policy itself was in many respects tortuous and deceitful. I think, however, that the secret lies in the fact that he was before all a religious man, in politics as in common life. That is, besides an unques- tionable personal piety, he looked upon the course of events throughout the world as ordered by Providence, whose in- tentions he understood, and with whom he was to co-operate. Where a man is perfectly certain, as Cromwell was, that he and his party are possessed of the truth and of God's lead- ing, there is danger that the conviction may induce unscru-
66 NAVAL STRATEGY
pulousness, conviction that the end justifies the means. The statesmanship of that day furnished no corrective. Few statesmen then got so far as to think that any jus- tification at all as to means was needed, if the end was desirable.
Protestantism, of extreme Calvinistic type in doctrine, and in church government Independency, or, as we now say, Congregationalism, were thus identified with the will of God. To sustain Protestantism on the Continent as well as at home was to carry out that will ; and it was to be done by diplomacy and by the sword, the two chief in- struments of international relations. In the condition of the world the problem was military. It was one of combi- nation and of force ; while in the insular position of Eng- land, and in its highly organized army and navy, Cromwell held in his hands the balance of power, the casting vote, so long, at any rate, as the two chief Roman Catholic states were at war, as they remained throughout his life. France and Spain soon realized that between them stood a Protes- tant zealot, able to turn the scale.
Cromwell's first move was to attempt a political concen- tration of all the Protestant forces. Besides advances to other Protestant states, there was proposed to Holland cooperation ; not by beggarly alliance, but by a political union of the two republics. To this Holland naturally de- murred, as she at that time possessed most of the carrying trade of the world ; and for the moment was easy in mind as to her dangerous neighbor, France. Besides, England's past history and present power indicated that to Holland, as the weaker partner, union would mean subjection, if not absorption. The proposition fell through ; but let us not &il to note here that it was revived, and in effect accepted, forty years later, when William III., a Dutch prince, sat on the English throne. Then, the very concentration which Cromwell had attempted in vain dragged down the power
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 67
of LfOois XIV. when at its height; bat then also Holland fell permanently into the second place, although it was her own ruler that reigned in England and inspired the action of combined Europe.
The reply to Holland's refusal was the English Naviga- tion Act, aimed, and aimed successfully, at Holland's supre- macy in the carrying trade. This was passed in October, 1651, and in May, 1652, hostilities began. The Act proba- bly was not the determinatiye cause of the war. It was only contributory ; but to discuss the causes in the then en- tangled state of international relations is foreign to our pur- pose, which has to do with the course of the war, not with its origins. A two years' struggle between the republics followed ; and this furnishes some apposite instruction on the subject of concentration, as well as suggests reflections upon international conditions contemporary with ourselves.
Before the time of Cromwell's government the English navy was seen in the Mediterranean only rarely and ex- ceptionally. Merchant vessels trading there were expected to look out for themselves. What is known to us as the convoy system, though practiced to some extent in the Narrow Seas and in the Atlantic traffic with France and Spain, had not been extended to the Mediterranean. The trade there was by a chartered company, the Levant Com- pany ; and the ships for their self -protection were of a size and armament which, according to the standards of that day, made them of little use for other commerce. The Mediterranean trade of England had been among the lesser of her commercial interests, and here also the Dutch had been supplanting her, both in merchant and naval vessels. Under the first Stuart kings, that is, till the day of Crom- well's power, a vigorous foreign policy had been impossi- ble ; because to maintain it Parliament must be summoned for supplies, and would make correspondent demands for concessions, which the sovereign was unwilling to grant.
68 NAVAL STRATEGY
Hence the navy was insnffioient in numbers, giving free scope to piracy. Barbaiy vessels swarmed even in Eng- lish waters; one hundred and fifty English vessels had been captured by them in the six years ending with 1651. French and Spanish privateers made similarly free with English ships during the period preceding CromweU.
The Commonwealth changed all this. To an extent never before known the State charged itself systemati- cally with the protection of commerce by the navy. This, as Corbett points out, necessarily introduced into naval thought a new strategic idea ; that, namely, of controlling commercial routes. To control a commercial route neces- sitates two strategic &ctors: (1) a mobile navy, and (2) local ports near the route, upon which the navy can rest as bases of operations. In seas where the State has no national possessions, the navy first comes and depends upon friendly harbors, as Dewey in 1898 depended on Hong Kong until war was declared ; but the inconvenience and uncertainty of such dependence leads directly to acquisi- tion of ports. The entrance of the English navy into the Mediterranean, to protect English shipping, led through a series of years and makeshifts to Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus ; ultimately to Suez, Aden, and beyond. Incidentally, Eng- land at one time occupied Tangier; at another, Corsica; and for long periods, Minorca.
Thus, when war broke out in 1652, both Dutch and English had squadrons in the Mediterranean, besides the main fleets in home waters. The English squadron made its headquarters in Leghorn, the chief port of Tuscany; the Grand Duke of which found profit and motive in the advantage to his dominion, as an emporium and center of British trade. The most part of the Dutch in the Medi- terranean at the outbreak of the war were concentrated off Toulon, for reasons which even now are not known cer- tainly. England was formally at peace with both the other
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 69
belligerents, France and Spain, but as between them Crom- well's policy at the moment inclined to Spain ; a condition which caused Porto Longone, in Elba, then a Spanish pos- session, to be hosptable to the English, France under Mazarines governance was less disposed than Spain then was to recognize a republic which had become such by beheading a king. But both states soon began to bid for
Cromwell's support A point on which your attention should specially &sten
is that under the conditions of that day the Mediterranean and the North Sea reproduced the problem with which Great Britain is to-day again confronted in them, and also that which confronts* the United States in the coincident demands of the Atlantic and the Pacific. It is an interest- ing circumstance that we now see the British navy con- centrated, up to eighty-five per cent of it^ battleship force, just where the English navy had to cling in the early days of Cromwell; and for the same reason, namely, the rise of a new maritime power near to the home shores. Before 1666 the provinces which now constitute Holland were simply Spanish dependencies. For the next forty years, through- out the reign of Elizabeth, they were occupied in the strug- gle which gave them independence, largely by the help of England, in the course of which their commercial and naval power developed. When Cromwell became Pro- tector, Dutch merchant shipping much outnumbered that of England, while the two navies at the opening of the war may be considered substantially equal in force. These conditions, and the momentary distribution of the navies which thence resulted, had a noticeable effect upon the course of the conflict known as the First Dutch War, 1652-1654, which went on coincidently with that between France and Spain. These were not the sole factors, but they were the principal. The political constitution of the Dutch Republic, a loose confederation of provinces with
70 NAVAL STRATEGY
mutual jealousies, interfered with the unity of administra- tion and organization essential to military efficiency, while at the same instant the strong militaiy sense of Cromwell was making the EngUsh navy a military organization in spirit and in form, which it never before had been* Nevertheless, the fortunes of the war fluctuated with the observance of concentration.
When hostilities opened, the Dutch Mediterranean force was superior in the aggregate. The English, inferior in to- tal, were also divided. One part was in Leghorn, with the officer in chief command ; but the other division was far away, up the Levant on convoy business. I do not pro- pose to give at length the movements of the several English detachments. Suffice it to say that the Dutch commander placed himself between them ; first by watching, or, as this measure is commonly called, blockading Leghorn (Position 1, a) ; then by judicious movements on interior lines, by which, while he concealed his position and intentions, he maintained always a central position, a position between the two. In the result, the English Levant detachment, reinforced as the custom still was by some of the stronger merchant ships, was brought to action off Elba, (i) Being distinctly inferior, it was well beaten and took refuge in Porto Longone, with the loss of one ship ; which, however, was recaptured afterwards in the neutral waters of Leghorn by the English ships lying there, and rejoined those at Porto Longone. Tliis battle was on August 28, 1652.
The Dutch admiral continued to ply between the island and Leghorn, maintaining his advantage of position. The two English commanders, however, could communicate, and it was arranged that they should tiy to unite and fight after the Elba ships had been repaired. The home govern- ment, having become dissatisfied with the Leghorn man, had transferred command to the one in Elba, who gave careful instructions for eveiy contingency he could foresee.
' ^ A Dutch and English in Mediterranean
1652-53
POSITION I Dutch English
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Leghorn
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POSITION 2
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HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 71
The odds, however, both of numbeTS and of positiim, were against him; as well as one of Holland's best seamen, in possession of the central position. Ako, something which had not been foreseen occurred, — a chance, — the total re- sult being that the L^hom diviBion was brought to action singly, beaten, and the whole save one taken. (Position 2, c.) This was eaily in March, 1653, six months after the first fight. There was then nothing left for the new commander-in-chief but to retreat with the Elba ships out of the Straits. This he did (<2), abandoning the Mediterranean, to which the English did not return dur- ing the war.
Meanwhile, after the first of these engagements, both the English officers concerned, as well as the (Commonwealth's diplomatic agent at Leghorn, had written pressing demands to the home government to send reinforcements, in order to hold the ground and sustain the honor of the flag ; and this the government undertook to do. The early events of the war in the North Sea and Channel had upon the whole favored the English, who then were in greater strength; but on the one occasion when substantially equal forces met under equal conditions, off Plymouth, in August, 1652, the result had been a drawn battle as regards the fleets. (Position 1, a.) Indeed,as the Dutch admiral, Ruyter, succeeded on that occasion in forcing his way through with a convoy, losing neither ship of war nor merchant vessel, while the English retired into port and there remained, vic- tory might be claimed by the Dutch. Ruyter saw his convoy clear into the Atlantic, picked up some returning merchant ships, and stood back up Channel, where he joined the main fleet, which had gone to sea under an Admiral De With, (b) Upon this junction followed an action with the enemy, known as the Battle of Kentish Knock, September 28, 1652. (c) The Dutch again were inferior in numbers, as in quality of vessels; but the re-
72 NAVAL STRATEGY
spective strengths, sixty-eight and sixty-foor, so far ap- proached equality as to suggest the reflection that their great superiority in the Mediterranean was dearly pur- chased by inferiority at the determining center of the war.
The English won a distinct victory. Encouraged by this success, and thinking it so decisive that, combined with the lateness of the season, the Dutch would not come out again in force, the English Government divided its fleet on more than one mission. (Position 2 a^o^a^ a.) Among others, heed was taken of the cry from the Med- iterranean; a squadron of twenty sail was detached to it, and started. The Dutch, however, had not been discouraged. They sent out a body of three hundred mer- chant ships, bound to the Atlantic, convoyed by seventy- three ships of war under their then greatest admiral, Tromp. The English main fleet under Blake, weakened to thirty-seven ships by the detachments, was badly de- feated on November 80. (i) The division on its way to the Mediterranean was then recalled {c) and rejoined the fleet. In consequence of this disaster, the Channel was filled for some weeks with Dutch cruisers, which there was no force to check. Also, when the news reached Leghorn, the Grand Duke, who had been offended already by the violation of the neutrality of his waters, changed his policy, and insisted that he could no longer permit his ports to be used by a belligerent This precipitated the unfortunate attempt of the Mediterranean officers to unite and fight, already narrated.
Instructed by these experiences in naval matters, the English Government, which then was thoroughly military in spirit and competent in act, concentrated their entire navy in home waters. When Tromp returned from the Atlantic with a convoy ten weeks later, in February, 1668, his seventy ships were met by eighty English, and a run-
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HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 78
ning fight up Channel followed. (<2) The embarrassment of the convoy was of coarse a further disadvantage to the Dutch admiral^ additional to inferior numbers. Neveiihe- less, bearing in mind the English disaster of three months before, and also the &ct that the Dutch under all disad- vantage made here again a good fight, the result must be attributed mainly to the concentration of the English fleet. Four or five Dutch ships of war were sunk, four captured, and some thirty-five of the merchant vessels taken.
At this time General Monk, a soldier trained in the Netherlands wars and in the recent Civil War, the same who a few years later was the chief agent in the restoration of Charles II., was transferred to service afloat. He com- manded a division in the fight last mentioned, February 18, 1658. Under his influence no further division was al- lowed of a force which, as it stood, was none too large for the work before it. The position of Oreat Britain rela- tively to the commercial approaches to Holland, whether by the Channel or the North Sea, gave her a strategic advantage over her enemy of that day precisely similar to that which by position she now enjoys over Germany. But, as has been said before, the advantage of position, however real and however great, depends upon the use made of it. The development of the German navy to-day is to be attributed, at least in part, to the recognition of this disadvantage of position, while the concentration of the British battleship force in home waters is the reflection of the German development. The measures of both countries are logical and inevitable resultants of forces — strategic, commercial, and economical — acting upon the interests of people.
The concentration of the English navy, in and after 1658, combined with the superior military organization of the fleet and the military sagacity of the government, effectually decided this war. At the end of eighteen
74 NAVAL STRATEGY
months the control over the approaches to Holland had put a stop to Dutch trade. Fifteen hundred Dutch ships were captured. This number, we are told, was double that of the English merchant shipping of that day — a contrast which throws light upon the jealousies between the two peoples and upon the motives of the English Navigation Act The sources of Dutch revenue were dried up. Work- shops were closed, work suspended. The Zuyder Zee be- came a forest of masts, the country full of beggars. Orass grew in the streets, and in Amsterdam fifteen hundred houses were untenanted. This was the result, not so much of fighting, as of strategic control of principal commercial routes.
Cromwell in 1654 granted terms of peace far easier than he might have exacted. It was not part of his policy to ruin a Protestant state. The soldier. Monk, was wroth, seeing only the immediate military end; the statesman realized that the contemporary European situation was one in which England needed a strong Holland, not an ex- hausted. Peace and cooperation better suited his policy, which was turning its eyes upon general external condi- tions in Europe and in the other continents. In the four years of life which remained to him he was to decide what advantage England and the cause of Protestantism might draw out of the then current war between France and Spain. Between these two his policy halted for some time, in a manner and to a degree which still constitutes a perplexity to historians.
Before quitting this part of our subject it seems expedi- ent to guard myself from the appearance of a mere dog- matic insistence upon the close concentration of direct contact Like every sound principle, concentration must be held and applied in the spirit, not in the letter only ; exercised with understanding, not merely literally. The essential imderlying idea is that of mutual support; that
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 75
the entire force, however distributed at the moment, is acting in such wise that each part is relieved by the others of a part of its own burden ; that it also does the same for them ; while the disposition in the dotted stations facili- tates also timely concentration in mass. A very consider- able separation in space may be consistent with such mutual support. The Japanese admirals, Togo and Kami- mura, before the fall of Port Arthur were separated, and for necessary reasons; yet each supported the other by positions which were between the two principal enemies' divisions, — i. e., central. Consequently each supported its colleague by the control each exercised over its im- mediate opponent The central position, too, facilitated junction or reinforcement, — transfer of force, — should such become advisable ; as in the engagement of Aug^ust 10, 1904, when Kamimura moved across the mouth of the Yellow Sea for a cooperation which in the result was not needed, because of the return of the Russian fleet to Port Arthur. Separations can be much wider than once they were, because steam and electricity make movement more certain and communication more quick than in old times ; but such changes have in no sense affected the fundamental necessity that the several divisions should be BO disposed that they support one another, and can combine by actual contact before the enemy by combination can overwhelm any one of them. This consideration, in my judgment, absolutely forbids the division of the present fleet of the United States between the two principal coasts. Such separation will be permissible only when each shall be superior to any probable enemy, as Togo was superior to the Port Arthur squadron, and Kamimura to that of Vladivostok, or when, by secure tenure of a central posi- tion, they can join in time to present a united mass.
CHAPTER V
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS
(Concluded)
BEFORE beginning to-day's lectnie, it will be con- ducive to the teachings I hope from its subject to say, now, that while it incidentally offers further illustration of the strategic advantage inherent in concentration, in central position, and in inte- rior lines, its principal lesson, the one on which 1 wish to lay the most stress, is the inevitableness with which the ap- pearance of a navy on a scene of operations distant from its home country leads to the acquirement of permanent positions in such a region, and the necessity of such posi- tions to the effectiveness of naval action.
I purpose first to pass in a rapid review, su£5cient only to give you the continuous historical setting of our lessons, the events intervening between the first war between the Dutch and English, 1652-1654, and those general European wars, beginning in 1689, in which the union of the two peoples under one ruler accomplished for them the con- centration of effort Cromwell had sought at first . In this intervening period there had been between them two other wars, upon which our present subject does not re- quire us to touch. The union under a single sovereign was realized for a short period, 1688-1702, during which the Stadtholder of Holland, who also was commander-in-chief of its sea and land forces, was at the same time King Wil- liam HI. of Great Britain. This temporary union of the two countries effected the concentration of the two navies under a single command; a condition which the overwhelming
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 77
power of Louis XIV. rendered of vital importance through- out, but which could not have been so perfectly attained had it not been for this brief period under one sovereign. By it was facilitated the close alliance which followed his death, and which was demanded by imperious necessity. Crom- well had sought the same, and failed. He, therefore, had been forced to beat the Dutch in order to achieve his desired teoncentration by paralyzing a rival whom he could not com- mand for an aUy. We shall consider first the action and effect of this concentrated naval power under Cromwell ; and afterwards, the action and effect of the concentration by union under one head, William III., as also, for a time, by alliance in the days of his immediate successor, Queen Anne.
Though the Dutch navy survived the war we have treated, both it and the country had suffered so severely as to have no stomach for immediate further fighting. This result, by leaving the English navy supreme over any other in Europe, was practically to concentrate naval power in Cromwell's hands, not by the alliance of Holland, but by her elimination ; especially so long as Spain and France, by continuing at war, tended to a balance of sea power between themselves. Mazarin's experience of the advantageous effect of the French navy upon the communications between Spain and Italy, after Richelieu's death in 1642, had led to a development of his naval policy, such as commonly fol- lows the entrance of a fleet upon a new scene of war. He had sought for advanced bases in the Mediterranean, by resting securely on which the scope and sweep of the French fleet would be expanded, and so the political power of France extended. First Elba and Piombino, a port in Italy over against Elba, were secured in 1646 ; following which Mazarin endeavored to establish in Naples a new rule, necessarily friendly to France.^ This attempt at f ur-
1 See map facing page M.
78 NAVAL STRATEGY
ther advance had only momentaiy success. These events, 1646-1648, were antecedent to Cromwell's power.
It was precisely the want of such local bases that at the first, after the conclusion of the Dutch war, made the ap- pearances and the influence of the English fleet inside the Straits of Gibraltar ephemeral and transient, even under a ruler as capable and resolute as Cromwell. Great effects were produced, but they were momentary; negative, so to say, rather than positive ; and, notable though they were, depended upon the simple existence of the fleet rather than upon its action. The policies of France and Spain were swayed less by what the English fleet did, than by the sense of what it might do if thrown into either scale. This is an illustration of the determining influence of armaments, even when no blood is shed ; a beneficent effect, of which recent and even present conditions still afford instances. - It may very well be that the silence of such action pre- vented Cromwell's recognizing clearly how much pressure the mere presence of the fleet exercised when Admiral Blake reached Gibraltar — then still a Spanish port — in November, 1654, six months after the peace with Holland. At that moment a French expedition had landed in Naples, to renew the attempt at detaching it from Spain. Success depended necessarily upon command of the sea, which was now the more precarious, because the internal commotions of France, known as the Fronde, had enabled Spain to regain Elba and Piombino. Blake at Gibraltar interposed between the French navy in the Mediterranean, then at Naples, and a large reinforcement on the way from Brest. Delays of the Brest division had enabled Bh^e to gain this central position, Gibraltar, where he was hospitably received; because at that time, although England was not formally at war with either France or Spain, it was understood on all hands that the state of reprisals which existed against France, owing to seizures of English merchant vessels by
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 79
French cruisers, would be followed by direct attack on French ships of war, if met. Already, two years before, in 1652, such an attack had been made by Blake in the Chan- nel upon French reinforcements proceeding to Dunkirk, with the immediate result that the port, then in French possession, was taken by the Spaniards. Now it became known at Naples that the same admiral was at Gibraltar ; while the other French division was still in the Atlantic, though just where, and what its condition, was not known. Actually, it had stopped at Lisbon and made no effort to proceed. While Blake, in accordance with his orders, waited to hear about it, the fleet at Naples had time to escape to Toulon, but at the cost of abandoning its undertaking. If Blake had gone on at once he might have destroyed it ; as it was, he forced it away by his mere position. There was decisive effect, though no fighting.
Corbett justly points out that such a result, which I have styled '^ negative,*' is apt to be overlooked, or at least may not arrest attention so as to affect future action. Thus, in the latest war. Port Arthur stands for a Japanese victory ; few are impressed with the fact that, till it fell, it detained from the main armies in Manchuria many more Japanese than it did Russians, and obtained abundant time for the Baltic fleet to arrive. That this did not arrive within that time was not attributable to Port Arthur. In the case before us Cromwell did not note the effect ex- erted by Blake*s presence; or, if he did, was not influenced sufficiently to turn his attention to the Mediterranean, and away from the Atlantic and America, which the traditions of Elizabeth, of Drake, and of Raleigh had constituted hitherto the chief aim of English naval ambitions.
This trend of national thought was held with the tena- cious conservatism characteristic of the English, and was emphasized also by the other equally strong tradition of Protestantism combining with the northern Powers of
80 NAVAL STRATEGY
Europe, including France, to resist Spain and Austria, the representative political exponents of Roman Catholicism. Cromwell embodied this tendency even to fanaticism. The Mediterranean continued to him only an incident. This is regretted by Corbett, whose theme is the Mediter- ranean. I myself think Cromwell was right as a simple matter of policy ^ though I do not excuse his conduct, even allowing for the bad faith characteristic of much diplomacy of that day.
What he did was this. While Blake at Gibraltar was supporting Spain by embarrassing France, and while out- wardly most friendly relations and correspondence char- acterized English intercourse with Spain, an expedition against the Spanish West Indies was quietly fitted out and despatched. It sailed in December, 1654, the same year that peace was concluded with Holland, at the very moment when Blake, enjoying the hospitality of Spain in Gibraltar, by his presence there compelled the French to abandon their attempt upon Naples, a Spanish dominion. In May, 1655, after failing at Santo Domingo, the West Indian expedition seized Jamaica; the English tenure of which dates from then.
Six months after this, in November, 1655, a formal peace with France put an end to the state of reprisals previously existing. Thereupon Spain declared war against England in the following February, 1656. A year later, March, 1657, came an offensive alliance between England and France against Spain. The stipulations of this were that, in return for aid by the English fleet and by six thousand Ekiglish auxiliary troops, Dunkirk and Mardyke on the Straits of Dover were to be taken by France from Spain and ceded to England. The possession of these ports not only would deprive privateering of a headquarters noxious to English trade, but would give England a bridgehead for landing on the Continent, in pursuance of Cromwell's inclination to
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 81
support the Protestant cause in north Europe. These ports would take the place once filled by their neighbor, Calais. This was doubtless not satisfactory to Mazarin; but the alliance aided him in the Netherlands, where chiefly he looked for gains from Spain, and also he hoped to juggle Cromwell to the advantage of France. He met his match, however, in the Protector, who insisted that the two Flemish ports be taken; and they were placed in English possession in July, 1658, three months before Cromwell died. Spain, exhausted by this powerful com- bination against her, and by internal decay, came to teims with France a year later — 1659 — in a treaty known as the Peace of the Pyrenees. France received the province of Artois in the Netherlands, and RoussiUon, by the east- em Pyrenees ; besides other extensions of her eastern boundary, the main object of her ambition. This war of Spain with combined England and France precipitated the final decline of the Spanish monarchy, which had been pro- gressing for some time. It marks the decisive turning point when Spain was seen evidently to have descended forever from her predominance in Europe.
The generation following Cromwell blamed hun for aiding France to this immense accession of power, which helped to make her imder Louis XIV. the dominant and threaten- ing state in Europe. To treat this question fully is beyond our scope, the more so that it is hopeless to expect such a demonstration as by universal acceptance should put an end to discussion. There are proB and c<m«, the decision between which is a matter of temperament and preposses- sion rather than of pure reason. From the military stand- point it is sufficient to point out that Cromwell left England with a position consolidated at home, with a su- preme fleet, an adequate army, and, through the two ports gained, with a favorable opening for intervention on the Continent, if that should be desirable. This assured her
82 NAVAL STRATEGY
military position for such contingencies in Europe as seemed then probable; while for the world abroad, in America and the East, the future depended upon the bal- ance of power in Europe, especially of the fleets. For such possessions abroad European countries were the bases of operations. Decision in Europe must precede acquisi- tion beyond seas.
In the great struggle with Louis XIY., soon to come, the English navy, no longer supreme, was reinforced by the alliance with Holland; as was also the English army. The Dutch ports also furnished then the bridgehead which Charles II. had surrendered when he gave up Dunkirk to France shortly after his restoration ; and alliance with Holland was &cilitated by the strong national and relig- ious prepossessions which had induced Cromwell to con- centrate English action in northern Europe, instead of in the Mediterranean, the day for action in which was not yet quite come. Then appeared the justification of his refusal to weaken Holland unduly. I think it is not too much to say that the career of William HI., from the time he became king of England, justifies the policy of Cromwell ; for although the immediate opponent was no longer the same, the situation was not dissimilar and the great outlines of action were closely parallel, — an army operating in the north of Europe, a fleet in the Channel or the Mediterranean, as occasion required. Cromwell's policy was based on the bed-rock of the mili- tary services as they stood when he died; not upon the course of the future Stuart kings, which he could in no wise foreknow. They, not he, fostered the power of Louis XIV.
Do I need to suggest to you that to-day ag^ain a supreme navy, an army adequate for external action, and a position consolidated in northern Europe, are the precise formulated requirements, to meet which Great Britain is striving?
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND COMMENTS 83
and also that upon this consolidation^ in home waters, depends the fortunes of her possessions abroad ? with the possible exception of Canada. Interference with Canada by a foreign state the United States could scarcely see and not act. But at this moment France, Russia, and Great Britain represent the England, Holland, and Germany of William III.; and the concentration of the fleet in the North Sea reproduces the conditions under the Dutch king. To-day, however, Germany is the dreaded enemy, not France.
From the death of Cromwell to the revolution which expelled James II. from the English throne was just thirty years, 1658-1688. I pass over them without notice. The English policy of the period, international as well as mili- tary, was vitiated and paralyzed by the resolve of the two Stuart kings to maintain their personal power and to resist concessions to their people. This object required inde- pendence of Parliament^ which to some extent was obtained by playing it off against Louis XIV. ; but military opera- tions require money, which only Parliament could give. Charles II. and James II. therefore maintained with the French king pecuniary and personal relations which ended in dependence upon him. Thus the aggressions of France upon Europe went on with England quiescent ; though not, as to her people, indifferent. Dunkirk and Mardyke on the Channel surrendered to France, Tangier acquired in the Mediterranean, indicate a feeble and tentative change of external policy ; but an effective external policy cannot exist where there is internal strife, whether between lo- calized factions, such as the North and South of the United States fifty years ago, or between people and rulers, as in the case now before us, and, indeed, from first to last of the Stuart dynasty.
A very recent French naval wiiter, Commander Daveluy, says with equal truth and force :
84 NAVAL STRATEGY
'* So long as a nation has not consolidated its unity, all its resources are not too much for employment upon its own territoiT. This is why England comd not lay the founda- tions of her colonial empire until after her union with Scot^ land. This is the reason that the French navy dates from Louis XIV.^ This is why the navy of Germany dates from the constitution of the Empire/'
It is worth your while to know, and to bear in mind as a momentous political contemporary &ct» that the annual expenditure upon the German navy has increased from less than ten million dollars in 1875, after the war with France, to over fifty millions in 1905 ; and tliat for the ten years suc- ceeding the estimates are over one hundred millions yearly. It may be added that the United States did not entertain a strong navy, and reach out beyond seas, till after the question of slavery had been settled, and the period of exaggerated States Rights, as well as the postrbellum ad- justment of the South, had been left behind. If the ques- tion with Spain, which culminated in 1898, had arisen before the War of Secession, the North as a community would have seen in war onl^ an attempt at extending the territory of slavery by taking Cuba, knowing that to be a favorite project of Southern leaders.
This effect of internal consolidation upon external action can be strikingly, yet briefly, illustrated from the periods we have been considering. In 1622, after a feeble inter- regnum of twelve years, following the death of Henry lY. in 1610, Richelieu became the ruler of France. In 1624, full of his project of separating Austria and Spain by controlling north Italy and the Alpine passes, he seized and occupied the Valtellines district^ east of Lake Como, through which are three principal passes to the upper Rhine and to the Inn. Upon this intervened a revolt of the Huguenots, with civil war. He had then to abandon
1 It might be more correct to say from Richelieu, the coDtoQdAtor of that